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Pierre Ciric* 
Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Are Public 
Accounting Firms Subject to Diverging Standards 
of Conduct between Federal Courts and the 
PCAOB in Securities Fraud Claims? 
In Tellabs v. Makor,1 the United States Supreme Court considered whether the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s Section 404(b) certification by a public accounting firm, in 
combination with other evidence, impacts the likelihood of a judicial finding of a 
“strong inference of scienter” required by the PSLRA to survive a pre-trial motion to 
dismiss a securities fraud claim against the public accounting firm. 
“Sarbanes-Oxley costs the American people money. It costs jobs. It costs our 
competitiveness. It hurts our markets.”2 
“The dirty little secret is that many CFOs love [Section] 404.”3 
“[A]ccounting firms simply cannot withstand an indictment. Can anyone 
say ‘The Big Three?’”4 
 
© 2014 Pierre Ciric 
 *   Pierre Ciric is the founder of the Ciric Law Firm, PLLC, and a board member of both the French-
American Bar Association and the New York Law School Alumni Association. A native of Paris, France, Mr. 
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business School. He held senior marketing and financial control positions in the United States at Pfizer, Inc., 
Sterling Winthrop, and Sanofi-Aventis. Mr. Ciric also gained significant litigation experience at Proskauer Rose 
and the National Center for Law and Economic Justice. He received his Juris Doctor summa cum laude from 
New York Law School where he was an Executive Board Member and Notes Editor of the New York Law School 
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 1.  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
 2.  Robert Schroeder, Group Sues over Governance Law: Challenge Mounted to Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
MARKETWATCH.COM. (Feb. 8, 2006, 4:35 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/group-targets-corporate-
governance-law-via-lawsuit (announcing a lawsuit by the Free Enterprise Fund challenging the constitutionality 
of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board).  
 3.  Amy Borrus, Learning to Love Sarbanes-Oxley, A Few Companies Have Discovered that Compliance 
Actually Helps to Cut Costs, BUS. WK., Nov. 21, 2005, at 128. 
 4.  Joseph Nocera, Auditors: Too Few to Fail, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2005, at C1. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection 
Act of 2002 (the “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”) became law on July 30, 20025 following a 
wave of corporate scandals at large corporations like Enron, Worldcom, Cendant, 
or Bristol-Myers Squibb,6 the controversy surrounding the so-called “section 404”7 
has been one of the most debated and argued provisions of the new law. Supporters 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, mostly investor groups and the plaintiffs bar, battle 
representatives of the business community who support the loosening of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act or a wider deregulation in the field of federal securities law.8  
Arguments on either side of the securities market regulation debate involve 
enormous financial stakes and critical policy questions: skyrocketing compliance 
costs, crippling regulation, a lack of competitiveness of the U.S. vis-à-vis other 
exchanges on the one side,9 compete with the need for corporate accountability and 
for transparency to ensure proper valuation of securities.10 At the center of the 
debate, a “perfect storm” is forming around the public accounting firm,11 which is 
statutorily entrusted to issue binding opinions on the truthfulness of the financial 
 
 5.  See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). 
 6.  See Top Ten Settlements Post-Reform Act Securities Class Action Settlements, STANFORD LAW SCH. SEC. 
CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://securities.stanford.edu/top-ten.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014); Kathleen 
F. Brickley, From Enron to Worldcom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U.L.Q. 357, 
359–60 (2003) (describing the accounting issues appearing with both the Enron and Worldcom scandals and 
their impact on the development of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002); Matthew S. Mokwa, Enron, Sarbanes-
Oxley, and the End of Earnings Management, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 325, 326 (2003) (describing the corporate practice 
of earnings management that has led to several accounting failures); Duke Helfand & Marc Lifsher, California 
Lawsuit Accuses Bristol-Myers Squibb of Fraud, Kickbacks, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com 
/2011/mar/19/business/la-fi-drug-kickbacks-20110319. 
 7.  15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012). 
 8.  See Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. 
REGULATION 7 (Nov. 30, 2006), http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf 
(recommending that the SEC loosen capital controls for foreign issuers). 
 9.  See Neal L. Wolkoff, Sarbanes-Oxley Is a Curse for Small-Cap Companies, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2005, at 
A13; Adriana Zea, Sarbanes-Oxley to Create Litigation Nightmare, ACCOUNTANCYAGE (Aug. 22, 2002), 
http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/1764223/sarbanes-oxley-create-litigation-nightmare; C. Koch, 
Compliance- The Sarbanes-Oxley Conspiracy, CIO (July 1, 2004), http://www.cio.com/article/29187/ 
Compliance_The_Sarbanes_Oxley_Sarbox_Conspiracy; Steve Forbes, Fact and Comment (Dump This 
Destructive Deadweight), FORBES.COM (Aug. 18, 2005, 6:00 PM), www.forbes.com/forbes/2005/0905/031.html. 
 10.  See K. Alvarado, Private Companies Embrace Sarbanes-Oxley, 62 INTERNAL AUDITOR, Aug. 2005, at 19; 
William J. McDonough, Promoting Public Trust, J. PUB. INQUIRY, Fall/Winter 2004–05, at 4, available at 
http://www.ignet.gov/randp/fw04jpi.pdf; Deloitte’s Point of View: Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance, DELOITTE 7 
(2004), http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Israel/Local%20Assets/Documents/A%20Bridge%20to%20 
Excellence(1).pdf; Amey Stone, SOX: Not So Bad After All?, BUSINESSWEEK.COM (July 31, 2005), 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-07-31/sox-not-so-bad-after-all. 
 11.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.19d–4 (2010) (aligning the definition of “public accounting firm” to the definition 
that appears in 15 U.S.C. § 7201(a)(9) (2012), which states that a public accounting firm is “a proprietorship, 
partnership, incorporated association, corporation, limited liability company, limited liability partnership, or 
other legal entity that is engaged in the practice of public accounting or preparing or issuing audit reports”). 
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disclosures by issuers registered on a U.S. Exchange.12  This liability storm already 
claimed its first victim, Arthur Andersen,13 which, following its involvement in the 
Enron scandal was criminally indicted14 and then later convicted on obstruction of 
justice charges.15  Following this conviction, on August 31, 2002, Arthur Andersen 
had to surrender its license to practice before the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”),16 effectively ending the company’s operations.17 A new front 
already opened in this liability storm with potential legal attacks against public 
 
 12.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(a) (2012) (Section 10A of the 1934 Act requires the audit report to include 
procedures designed for the purpose of detecting illegal acts having a material impact on the financial 
statements, designed to identify related party transactions which are material to the financial statements, and an 
evaluation as to any doubt about the ability of the entity to continue as a going concern.). 
 13.  See Ken Brown and Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Arthur Andersen’s Fall From Grace Is a Sad Tale of Greed and 
Miscues, WALL ST. J., June 07, 2002, at A1.  The firm of Arthur Andersen was created in 1913 by Arthur 
Andersen and Clarence DeLany as Andersen, DeLany & Co.  SUSAN E. SQUIRES ET AL., INSIDE ARTHUR 
ANDERSEN: SHIFTING VALUES, UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES 109 (2003). The firm changed its name to Arthur 
Andersen & Co. in 1918. In 1989, Arthur Andersen and Andersen Consulting became separate units of 
Andersen Worldwide.  Id. at 30.  The two organizations spent most of the 1990s in a bitter dispute, which ended 
in 2000, when Andersen Consulting gained its independence from Arthur Andersen against a $1.2 billion 
settlement and a change of name; as a result Andersen Consulting changed its name to Accenture.  Id. at 92. 
 14.  See Grand Jury Indictment, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, No. CR H-02-121, 2002 WL 
34718543 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2002). This was the first time that a criminal charge was ever brought against a 
major U.S. accounting firm.  See Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Many Strands: The Investigation; Andersen Charged 
With Obstruction in Enron Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at A1. 
 15.  See Greg Farrell, Arthur Andersen Convicted of Obstruction of Justice, USA TODAY (June 15, 2002, 2:10 
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/energy/enron/andersen-verdict.htm. The conviction of Arthur 
Andersen was later unanimously reversed on May 31, 2005 in Arthur Anderson, LLP v. United States, where the 
Court held that the jury instructions were misleading as to the intent element of the obstruction of justice 
charge, and that the corrupt persuasion requirement of the obstruction of justice charge required a higher 
threshold of consciousness of wrongdoing. 544 U.S. 696, 706 (2005). 
 16.  The Securities and Exchange Commission was created by Section 4 of the 1934 Act.  15 U.S.C. § 78d 
(2012); see also The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secexact 
1934 (last visited Jan. 15, 2014). The 1934 Act also authorizes the SEC to require audited financial statements in 
public periodic filings. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(b), 78m(a)(2) (2012); A.C. Pritchard, The Irrational Auditor and 
Irrational Liability, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 19, 29 (2006) (“Although the SEC briefly flirted in its early years 
with the creation of uniform accounting principles under the leadership of Chairman William O. Douglas, it 
ultimately chose to delegate the formulation of generally accepted accounting principles and generally accepted 
auditing standards to the accounting industry. Financial statements filed with the SEC were required to be 
prepared in accordance with principles having ‘substantial authoritative support.’ In practice, that meant 
delegation of the promulgation of accounting principles and auditing standards to the accounting industry’s 
trade association, now known as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).”). 
 17.  See Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on Enron, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at 
A1; see also Cheryl D. Block, Congress and Accounting Scandals: Is the Pot Calling the Kettle Black, 82 NEB. L. REV. 
365, 367 (2003) (referring to the collapse of Arthur Andersen); Ethan S. Burger, Regulating Large International 
Accounting Firms: Should the Scope of Liability for Outside Accountants be Expanded to Strengthen Corporate 
Governance and Lessen the Risk of Securities Law Violations?, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (referring to the 
collapse of Arthur Andersen); James Kelly, The Power of an Indictment and the Demise of Arthur Andersen, 48 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 509, 517 (2006) (discussing “the death of Arthur Andersen”); Stephan Landsman, Death of an 
Accountant: the Jury Convicts Arthur Andersen of Obstruction of Justice, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1205 (2003) 
(addressing Enron’s role in the collapse of Arthur Andersen). 
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accounting firms in the aftermath of the subprime lending crisis.18  Troubling signs 
of significant exposure have already surfaced in the litigation pipeline,19 and in the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) inspection reports.20 
The public accounting firm fulfills a critical role, because it is considered to be 
the primary watchdog over the reporting entity, both on behalf of the investing 
public and on behalf of the regulatory authorities which enforce securities laws.21 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act represented a significant change in the regulation process 
of the public accounting industry in several ways: the accounting profession is, for 
the first time, under the direct oversight of a government-sponsored organization, 
the PCAOB;22 auditors are subject to new auditor independence and conflict of 
interest rules;23 and Section 404 of Title IV of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires a 
management assessment of internal controls, which then must be tested and 
certified to by the public accounting firm in charge of certifying the financial 
 
 18.  See Heather M. Tashman, The Subprime Lending Industry: An Industry in Crisis, 124 BANKING L.J. 407, 
407–08 (2007) (summarizing the subprime lending crisis); Marie Leone, Ex-Auditors Settle Securitization 
Charges, CFO.COM (Sept. 21, 2007), http://ww2.cfo.com/accounting-tax/2007/09/ex-auditors-settle-
securitization-charges/ (summarizing the subprime lending crisis on auditors). 
 19.  See, e.g., In re Metro. Sec. Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1271 (E.D. Wash. 2007). 
 20.  PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE NO. 104-2007-129, REPORT ON 2006 INSPECTION OF 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP 4–6 (Oct. 18, 2007), available at http://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Reports/ 
Documents/2007_PricewaterhouseCoopers.pdf. 
 21.  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 218 (1976) (“The critical importance of the auditing 
accountant’s role in insuring full disclosure cannot be overestimated. The SEC has emphasized that in certifying 
statements the accountant’s duty ‘is to safeguard the public interest, not that of his client.’” (citing Touche, 
Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670–671 (1957))); see also United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 
(2d Cir. 1964) (“In our complex society the accountant’s certificate and the lawyer’s opinion can be instruments 
for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar. Of course, Congress did not mean that 
any mistake of law or misstatement of fact should subject an attorney or an accountant to criminal liability 
simply because more skillful practitioners would not have made them. But Congress equally could not have 
intended that men holding themselves out as members of these ancient professions should be able to escape 
criminal liability on a plea of ignorance when they have shut their eyes to what was plainly to be seen or have 
represented a knowledge they knew they did not possess.”); Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC Address at the Fall 
Council of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (Oct. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch410.htm (“[The auditing profession is] a franchise that demands you 
defend and protect, above all else, the public trust; a franchise that asks you to stand firm—even under the 
weight of management’s pressure to ‘see things their way’”). 
 22.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).  Title I establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board and defines its mandate (registration and inspection of public accounting firms, definition of auditing 
standards, oversight of the SEC); Title II addresses the issues of auditor independence (services excluded from 
the practice of auditors, partner rotation rules, auditor reports to audit committees, conflict of interest rules); 
Title III addresses corporate responsibility (penalties on officers and directors, role of audit committees, rules of 
professional responsibility for attorneys); Title IV addresses the enhanced financial disclosure requirements, 
while Titles V through XI deal with various conflict and penalties issues. Id. 
 23.  See id. 
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statements.24  In this new environment, the public accounting industry is subject to 
two conflicting pressures: on one side, its mandate is to certify to the transparency 
and accuracy that investors seek when making investment decisions, and on the 
other it owes a duty to its client to manage and minimize the regulatory burdens.25  
In the midst of this conflict, public accounting firms are subject to the potential risk 
of considerable legal liability in private securities litigations, and, unlike other 
industries, have become the subject of a unique debate, where many agree that one 
cannot afford the bankruptcy or disappearance of another public accounting firm.26 
For instance, following Bernard Madoff’s guilty plea in March 2009 to eleven 
counts of offenses related the Ponzi scheme he facilitated through his investment 
advisory firm,27 its independent auditor, David Friehling of Friehling & Horowitz 
 
 24.  Following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, an issuer and its public accounting firm are subject 
to three different periodic certifications requirements. First, under Section 302 of the act, the issuer must follow 
a set of internal procedures designed to ensure accurate financial disclosure. 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2012). The 
signing officers must certify that they are “responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls” and 
“have designed such internal controls to ensure that material information relating to the issuer is made known 
to such officers by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which the periodic reports are 
being prepared.” 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4) (2012). Second, under Section 906, the signing officers must attest to 
the fair representation of the financial condition and results of operations and face criminal penalties for 
misrepresentation. 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). Both Section 302 and Section 906 overlap, but Section 302 “feeds 
into” the Section 906 certification. Third, under Section 404(a), management is required to produce an 
“internal control report” as part of each 10K Annual Report, which must attest to “the responsibility of 
management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for 
financial reporting.” 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (2012). Under Section 404(b), external auditors are required to issue 
an opinion on whether effective internal control over financial reporting was maintained in all material respects 
by management. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2012). This is in addition to the financial statement opinion regarding the 
accuracy of the financial statements.  
 25.  See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817–18 (1984) (“By certifying the public 
reports that collectively depict a corporation’s financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public 
responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant 
performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as 
well as to the investing public. This ‘public watchdog’ function demands that the accountant maintain total 
independence from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust. To insulate from 
disclosure a certified public accountant’s interpretations of the client’s financial statements would be to ignore 
the significance of the accountant’s role as a disinterested analyst charged with public obligations.”); see also 
Gregory L. Paul, Not Biting the Hand That Feeds You: Public Accounting Firms and Conflicts of Interest, 34 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 325 (2004) (offering further analysis of United States v. Arthur Young & Co.). 
 26.  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-864, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS, MANDATED STUDY ON 
CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITION 1 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03864.pdf (showing 
that, in 2002, the vast majority of large corporations are audited by the “Big 4,” i.e. PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & 
Young, and KPMG). One must also notice the short term economic benefit for public accounting firms 
represented by the considerable increase in revenues from Sarbanes-Oxley-related activities, including Section 
404 control audits, and associated consulting activities. See Andrew J. Weidman, Are We Failing the Exam?: 
Many Graduates Are Not Pursuing Their CPA Certificates , ACCT. TODAY, Sept. 2006, at 29. (“If you look at the 
revenue growth of public accounting firms over the past couple of years, you will see that our industry is in the 
midst of an economic boom. According to a March 2006 special supplement to Accounting Today on the Top 
100 Firms, over 75 percent of these firms experienced double-digit growth over the previous year.”). 
 27.  Seth L. Laver, Bernie Madoff and Auditor Liability: Emerging Trends and Defenses (2012) available at 
http://dritoday.org/feature.aspx?id=320. 
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CPAs was charged with securities fraud in March 2009.28 The SEC’s complaint 
alleged that Friehling aided and abetted under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 
among other things. Friehling agreed not to contest the SEC’s charges.29 Although 
litigation was brought against the auditors engaged in the audits of the Bernard L. 
Madoff Investment Securities feeder and sub-feeder funds,30 none of the auditors to 
the feeder and sub-feeder funds have been held liable.31 
Under federal law, public accounting firms are subject to liability for securities 
fraud under either the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”) or the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”),32 but only if the plaintiff investors have 
succeeded in meeting a high pre-trial threshold created by the heightened pleading 
requirement of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”).33 
Therefore, between 1995 and 2002, the courts have developed a “federal common 
law”34 standard to determine whether a public accounting firm may be subject to 
liability for securities fraud under the federal securities law.35  Due to the limited 
professional oversight of the accounting profession and to the lack of judicial 
guidance by the U.S. Supreme Court,36 the “common law” scienter standard 
developed by the federal courts was inconsistent and confusing.37  However, Section 
404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act considerably changes the nature of the duty of care 
required by public accounting firms in complying with their statutory obligations, 
because it provides a new mandate, according to which the auditor must “attest to, 
and report on, management’s assessment of the company’s internal control 
structure and procedures.”38 Therefore, since 2002, courts have struggled to 
reconcile the legal standard developed under the PSLRA heightened pleading 
 
 28.  SEC, 21274, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. DAVID F. FRIEHLING, C.P.A AND FRIEHLING & 
HOROWITZ, CPA’S, P.C. 1(S.D.N.Y. CIV. 09 CV 2467) 1 (2009),  available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
Litreleases/2009/lr21274.htm. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  See Stephenson v PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 482 Fed. Appx. 618 (2d. Cir. 2012), In re Merkin, 817 
F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), Saltz v First Frontier, L.P., 485 Fed. Appx. 461 (2d. Cir. 2012). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  15 U.S.C. §§ 77f, 78f (2012). 
 33.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012) (plaintiff has to state with particularity all relevant facts for each 
allegation and must show that these facts will give “rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the 
requisite state of mind”).   
 34.  See United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Even if federal common law 
otherwise would operate, it is displaced when Congress has decided the matter.”); see also Edward A. Fallone, 
Section 10(b) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law: The Merits of Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under 
a Structuralist Approach, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 74(1997) (referring to “a kind of federal common law” 
(quotation marks omitted)).  
 35.  See infra Section IV. 
 36.  See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194, 214 (1976). 
 37.  See infra note 94.  
 38.  See supra notes 8 and 25. 
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requirement and the certification requirements imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.39 
Although federal circuit courts have pondered on the impact of a Sarbanes-
Oxley certification securities fraud claims against insider defendants, the question 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404(b) certification’s role on a securities fraud claim 
has not yet been incorporated by the federal judiciary in the assessment of the 
public accounting firm’s liability.40 
This article argues that the federal courts must modify the legal standard used to 
determine the scienter requirement in a Section 10(b) securities fraud claim against 
a public accounting firm,41 because the Section 404(b) certification requirement, 
along with the jurisprudence of the enforcement agencies, such as the PCAOB or 
the SEC, can no longer be reconciled with the federal “common law” of scienter.  
Courts need to revise the scienter standard in order to reconcile the federal 
common law with the new guidance of the U.S. Supreme Court42 and with the 
emerging standards developed by the PCAOB in its enforcement efforts. 
Part II provides an overview of the evolution of the auditor’s liability from the 
common law prior to the 1933 and 1934 Acts until the adoption of the PSLRA, as 
well as an overview of the federal common law rule developed by courts to analyze 
auditors’ liability.  Part III explains two significant changes to this environment, the 
Section 404(b) requirements and the new legal framework developed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Tellabs v. Makor.43 Finally, Part IV explains why the courts must 
reconcile the legal standard applied to auditors under the Tellabs analysis, and 
provides guidance for a scienter analysis based on the case law already forming in 
the enforcement efforts of the PCAOB.  In particular, federal courts will have to 
consider changing the “strong inference of scienter” test by incorporating the 
impact of additional inferences of knowledge based on the auditor certifications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39.  See discussion infra Section III. 
 40.  See discussion infra Section III. 
 41.  See infra note 66. 
 42.  See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
 43.  Id. 
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II. HISTORY 
A. Historical Background 
The historical context for the liability of the external auditor44 has its origins in a 
combination of contract law and tort law.45 Under contract law, a plaintiff can 
recover only if he is able to prove that the accountant acted in an incompetent 
fashion, i.e. did not follow professional standards as defined by generally accepted 
accounting principles (“GAAP”) or generally accepted accounting standards 
(“GAAS”).46  Under tort law, the plaintiff has to prove that the accountant acted 
fraudulently, i.e. that there was intent to defraud the client through 
misrepresentations in the audit.47 Historically, the liability of auditors arising out of 
the review and certification of the financial representations of their clients slowly 
but progressively expanded.48 Civil liability could be imposed against auditors either 
on the basis of fraud, which required an intent to deceive, combined with a reliance 
on the auditor’s opinion, or on the basis of negligence, which involved a lesser 
degree of culpability.49 The traditional “privity”50 approach, still present within 
 
 44.  PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD.,  RULE 1001(a)(xii) at 26, available at 
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/PCAOBRules/Documents/Section_1.pdf (defining auditor, which “means both public 
accounting firms registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and associated persons 
thereof”), effective pursuant to Order Approving Proposed Rules Relating to Registration System, Exchange 
Release No. 34-50,331, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 87,256 (Sept. 8, 2004), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
pcaob/34-50331.htm. However, the PCAOB does not distinguish in Rule 1001 the external auditor is a common 
expression synonymous to the PCAOB defined term of “public accounting firm,” Rule 1001 does not define the 
internal auditor, who usually designates employees of the issuer hired to assess and evaluate its system of 
internal control. To maintain independence, they usually present their reports directly to the Board of Directors 
or to top management. In addition, as internal auditors are employees of the issuer, they are assumed to be able 
to more easily find out the frauds and any accounting improprieties. 
 45.  See DAN L. GOLDWASSER & M. THOMAS ARNOLD, ACCOUNTANTS’ LIABILITY 1-2 to -8 (Larry D. 
Soderquist ed. 1996) (providing a detailed historical overview of the liability of accountants). 
 46.  See In re Cardinal Health Sec. Litig., 426 F. Supp. 2d 688, 707 n.26 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (defining the 
GAAP standard as “the ‘basic postulates and broad principles of accounting pertaining to business enterprises, 
approved by the Financial Accounting Standards Board of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA)’” and GAAS as the “standards prescribed by the Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA 
for the conduct of auditors in the performance of an examination”).  The court went on to state that “[i]n the 
event there is no official pronouncement, the consensus of the accounting profession, as manifested in 
textbooks, for example, determines GAAP.”  Id.; see also AM. INST. OF CPAS, The Meaning of Present Fairly in 
Conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, AU § 9411 (2000), available at http://www.aicpa.org/ 
Research/Standards/AuditAttest/DownloadableDocuments/AU-00411_9.pdf (providing guidance to auditors 
on GAAP); AM. INST. OF CPAS, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, AU § 316.01 (2007), 
available at http://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/DownloadableDocuments/ 
AU-00316.pdf  (disputing the presumption of validity in the case where no GAAP rule exists).  
 47.  GOLDWASSER & ARNOLD, supra note 41, at 4-2 to -5. 
 48.  Several authors have detailed the progression of the common law view of accountant liability.  See, e.g., 
Richard P. Swanson, Theories of Liability, in ACCOUNTANTS’ LIABILITY: ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 
24, 26–52 (2008), available at  http://files.ali-aba.org/free/coursematerials/cr008-course.pdf; Thomas L. 
Gossman, The Fallacy of Expanding Accountant’s Liability, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 213, 215 (1998).  
 49.  See GOLDWASSER & ARNOLD, supra note 41, at 4-37, 4-55. 
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certain state jurisdictions, was to limit the auditor’s liability for negligent 
misrepresentations or for intentional tortuous behavior only to its client or to third 
parties known to the auditor, where the third parties intended to receive and relied 
on the audit report.51  The Restatement of torts approach extended the liability for 
loss suffered to any person or group of persons the auditor intended to supply the 
information or knew the recipient intended to supply it.52 The so-called “California 
rule,” adopted in Rosenblum v. Adler,53 expanded the auditor’s liability to any person 
whom the accountant could reasonably have foreseen would obtain and rely on the 
accountant’s opinion, including known and unknown investors.54 
Beyond their traditional common-law and state law obligations, and following 
the passage of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, external auditors had to follow a new federal 
mandate regarding audit engagements which involve corporations in which stock is 
traded on a U.S. national exchange and is subject to the periodic reporting 
requirements of the 1934 Act:55 first, the external auditor must comply with the 
required procedures of audit performance, necessary investigation and disclosure to 
the Audit Committee.56 This new requirement imbedded at the federal level the 
common-law notion that the auditor is obligated to investigate or disclose any 
 
 50.  See Gossman, supra note 44, at 216 (“Privity is the connection that exists between parties to a contract. 
It is essential to the maintenance of a contract action that privity exist between the plaintiff and the defendant. It 
is clear that when an accountant and a client enter into a valid contract for the performance of an audit, the 
accountant and the client share a relationship of privity.”); see also Swanson, supra note 44, at 27 (discussing the 
role of privity in accountants’ liability). 
 51.  See generally Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170 (1931); see also Swanson, supra note 44, at 26–
27 (“In the seminal case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, New York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, held 
that persons damaged by their reliance on an accountant’s negligently prepared financial statements who were 
not in privity with the accountant may not recover, unless they could show either (i) that the accountant 
defrauded them, or (ii) that the accountant actually knew they would rely on the financial statements.”); 
Gossman, supra note 44, at 218 (“In substance, the Ultramares court set down the rule that an auditor will be 
liable for negligent misrepresentation only to its client and to any third parties whose identities are known to 
the auditor as parties intended to receive and rely on the audit report. It is significant that the Ultramares 
opinion still does not refer to the latter as parties in privity, but as persons with whom the bond is ‘so close as to 
approach that of privity, if not completely one with it.’ Although the intent is clear, perhaps it was yet too soon 
to chance clouding the issue of who should be permitted to sue for the breach of a contract with semantic 
questions of what is meant by ‘privity.’”). 
 52.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 (1977) (extending professional liability beyond 
Ultramares to the known and intended class of beneficiaries. though limited to parties for whom reliance was 
actually foreseen by, rather than merely foreseeable to, the accountant.”). 
 53.  See Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 352 (1983). 
 54.  See generally Steven E. Stark, Rosenblum v. Adler: Auditor’s Liabiliy for Negligent Misrepresentation—
”The Explosive Power Resident in Words,” 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 939 (1984) (reviewing in detail the changes 
brought by Rosenblum v. Adler). 
 55.  A reporting issuer will be subject to the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act under one of three 
possible approaches: (1) Section 12(b) of the 1934 Act will cover any issuer of any class of securities listed on a 
National Securities Exchange; (2) Section 12(g)(1) will cover any entity with assets in excess of $10 Million, and 
with a class of equity securities held by at least 500 persons; (3) Section 15(d) will cover any entity which filed a 
Registration Statement under the 1933 Act, which then became effective.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78(a) to 78-4(e) (2012). 
 56.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2012). 
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matter which may be material to the financial condition of its client,57 because “it 
simply cannot be true that an accountant is under no duty to disclose what he 
knows when he has reason to believe that, to a material extent, a corporation is 
being operated not to carry out its business in the interest of all the stockholders.”58  
Second, since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the external auditor must 
attest to an internal controls report prepared by the issuer.59 
Up until the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the oversight of the accounting 
profession was very limited: The 1933 and 1934 Acts empowered the SEC to 
regulate the accounting standards used in the financial statements included in the 
SEC periodic requirements.60  This authority was immediately delegated to the 
auditor’s trade group, the American Institute of Accountants, later renamed the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.61  It is under this authority that 
the AICPA created the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) in 1978.62 The ASB 
attempted to reinforce its oversight through the creation of the Public Oversight 
Board (POB) in 1977, however, its lack of sanctioning power and independence 
created enough political pressure for Congress to replace it by the PCAOB.  It is the 
 
 57.  See Richard F. Langan, Jr., The Integrated Disclosure System, Registration and Periodic Reports Under the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, in TRANSACTIONAL LAWYER’S DESKBOOK: ADVISING BUSINESS ENTITIES 
(Arthur N. Field & Morton Moskin eds., 2001) (indicating that Item 8 of the 10K Form is where the auditor’s 
report and all detailed audited financials must be located). For a thorough review of the history of the Auditor’s 
report); see also Arthur Acevedo, How Sarbanes-Oxley Should be Used to Expose the Secrets of Discretion, 
Judgment, and Materiality of the Auditor’s Report, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 13 n.81 (2005) (“There are 
generally four different species of auditor’s opinion contained within the standard auditor’s report. The four 
variants are an unqualified opinion, a qualified opinion, a disclaimer opinion and an adverse opinion. The 
unqualified opinion is desired by all audit clients because it is perceived to be a bill of clean health. A full review 
of the reasons for and uses of the different opinions is beyond the scope of this work.”). 
 58.  United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 806 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 59.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012). For a general discussion of the impact of Section 404 on external auditors 
see also Tosha Huffman, Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Where the Knee Jerk Bruises Shareholders and Lifts 
the External Auditor, 43 BRANDEIS L. J. 239, 253 (2004) (“[T]he external auditor must employ more tests of 
internal controls than what was previously utilized to develop an audit plan. The purpose for the increased 
internal control procedures is to allow the auditor to obtain a greater understanding of the operating 
effectiveness of the internal controls system.  Such an understanding is necessary to express an opinion on the 
effectiveness of the internal controls and management’s assessment of their effectiveness.”). 
 60.  See supra note 17. 
 61.  See History of the AICPA, AM. INST. OF CPAS, www.aicpa.org/About/MissionandHistory/Pages/History 
of the AICPA.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2014) (“The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
and its predecessors have a history dating back to 1887, when the American Association of Public Accountants 
(AAPA) was formed. In 1916, the American Association was succeeded by the Institute of Public Accountants, 
when there was a membership of 1,150. The name was changed to the American Institute of Accountants in 
1917 and remained so until 1957, when it changed to its current name of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants. The American Society of Certified Public Accountants was formed in 1921 and acted as a 
federation of state societies. The Society was merged into the Institute in 1936 and, at that time, the Institute 
agreed to restrict its future members to CPAs.”). 
 62.  Auditing, Attestation and Quality Control Standards Setting Activities: Operating Policies, AM. INST. OF 
CPAS 1, http://www.aicpa.org/research/standards/auditattest/asb/downloadabledocuments/asb%20operating% 
20policies%20document%20(2009-10).pdf. 
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self-regulatory nature of the accounting profession which was cited as a 
contributing factor to the lack of detection of corporate fraud by auditors.63 
Under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the public accounting firm is subject to two 
significant risks of liability: First, under Section 11 of the 1933 Act,64 all the plaintiff 
has to prove to impose liability against the public accounting firm which 
contributed to the development of the registration statement, is that the document 
contained a material misstatement or omission, and that the investors purchased 
the security under that registration statement.65  The plaintiff need not prove any 
contractual relationship with the accountant, or prove any fraudulent intent by the 
external auditor or accountant who contributed to the registration process.66 Unlike  
Section 11, under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, plaintiff must establish, amongst 
other elements, the fraudulent intent of the auditor.67 
 
 63.  See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo With Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private 
Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 990 (2005) (“As Lynn Turner, former Chief Accountant at the SEC, 
testified [during the Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public 
Companies: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 532 
(2002)]: They actually draft the standards. One of the problems with that part of the system today is, when they 
go through that drafting process, since it is all being done by the firms themselves, in fact, their legal counsels 
get involved in editing those very standards themselves, those standards tend to be written to protect the 
accounting firms in case they get in trouble on an audit, sometimes probably which is deserved, and quite 
frankly, sometimes which is not deserved. . . . It is not drafted with the public interest in mind . . . . As long as 
you leave that standards setting process in the hands of the firms and of the firm’s legal counsel, you are going 
to get standards written to protect them in court, as opposed to standards written to ensure that they do audits 
that will protect the public.”). 
 64.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012) (codifying Section 11 of the Securities Act). 
 65.  Id. Under Section 11 of the 1933 Act, no scienter or reliance needs to be proven. However, Section 11 
places the burden on the defendants to show their non-culpability regarding the issuance of the Registration 
Statement. 
 66.  See Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697–98 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“Section 11(b) 
provides: ‘Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) no person . . . shall be liable as provided therein 
who shall sustain the burden of proof— . . . (3) that . . . (B) as regards any part of the registration statement 
purporting to be made upon his authority as an expert . . . (i) he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable 
ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became effective, that the 
statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein 
or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading . . . .’”). Against the potential Section 11 liability, the 
external auditor will be entitled to assert a due diligence defense to defeat claims of negligence in discharging his 
responsibilities, whereas he will be subject to potential liability only for those portions of the registration 
statement they are responsible for preparing as experts. 
 67.  See Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1123 n.4 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating requirements for 
primary Rule 10b-5 claim as, “the defendant (1) made an untrue statement of material fact or omitted a 
material fact that rendered misleading the statements made (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
security, (3) with the intent to mislead, and (4) which caused the plaintiff’s loss.” (citing Renovitch v. Kaufman, 
905 F.2d 1040, 1045 n.7 (7th Cir. 1990))); Francine A. Ritter, Accountability of the Independent Accountant As 
Auditor In the Wake Of Central Bank: Does the Implied Private Right of Action Survive Under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 873, 891–92 (1998) (“[Following the Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder decision,] 
the Rule 10b-5 cause of action closely resembles a claim for common-law fraud. In order to set forth a 
successful private Rule 10b-5 claim, plaintiffs must prove that the defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged 
in manipulative or deceptive conduct, that the plaintiff relied on this conduct, and that the defendant’s conduct 
proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.”); see also cases cited infra note 90. 
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B. Section 10(b) Liability 
Under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, enacted in response to widespread abuses in the 
securities markets perceived to contribute to the market crash of 1929, Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC, are general anti-fraud provisions 
which prohibit any person from using or employing any manipulative or deceptive 
device in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.68  The jurisprudence 
from federal courts recognized an implied private right of action under Rule 10b-
5,69 but also imposed a number of requirements, most notably a deception in 
connection with the securities transaction,70 the use of jurisdictional means,71 and a 
requirement that plaintiffs must have standing as actual purchasers and sellers of 
securities.72 For a Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 cause of action to be successful, plaintiff 
must assert that the deception involved material information,73 that defendant acted  
 
 
 
 
 68.  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997). 
 69.  Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); Ritter, supra note 
63, at 890–91 (“While conceding that a strict statutory interpretation of Section 10(b) provides no express 
private remedy, since 1946 federal courts have consistently recognized implied private rights of action under 
both Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In permitting private recovery under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, lower 
federal courts have analogized the principles of tort law to the 1934 Act’s broad remedial purpose of protecting 
investors. The Supreme Court of the United States has bolstered this liberal interpretation of Section 10(b) by 
asserting that private recovery comports with the 1934 Act’s underlying policy objective of protecting investors 
through the use of full and fair disclosure. Since defrauded purchasers and sellers of securities have attained 
standing to sue under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, violators of these provisions have faced expanded 
liability.”). 
 70.  See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819, 822 (2002) (holding that misstatements may be actionable as a 
breach of fiduciary duty and as fraud in connection with securities transactions) (“[T]he SEC has consistently 
adopted a broad reading of the phrase ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security’ . . . . 
[Accordingly, i]t is enough that the scheme to defraud and the sale of securities coincide.”). 
 71.  I.e. the use of instrumentality of interstate commerce, such as mails, or a national securities exchange. 
 72.  See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737–38 (1975) (recognizing that the 
Birnbaum rule bars three potential classes of plaintiffs: first there are “potential purchasers of shares . . . who 
allege that they decided not to purchase because of an unduly gloomy representation or the omission of 
favorable material which made the issuer appear to be a less favorable investment vehicle than it actually was. 
Second are actual shareholders in the issuer who allege that they decided not to sell their shares because of an 
unduly rosy representationFalse Third are shareholders, creditors, and perhaps others related to an issuer who 
suffered loss in the value of their investment due to corporate or insider activities in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities which violate Rule 10b-5.”). 
 73.  See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1987) (endorsing the standard of materiality for Section 
10(b) causes of action from TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), whereby an omitted fact 
is material if there is a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by 
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of information made available). 
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with scienter,74 that plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation or deception,75 which 
caused plaintiff’s financial injuries that can be translated in measurable damages. 
Therefore, the critical element a plaintiff must satisfy to establish a cause of 
action under federal law is the scienter requirement, whereby the plaintiff must 
prove that the auditor acted with either intent to defraud or was sufficiently reckless 
in the performance of its audit that it consisted a conscious disregard of its 
professional and statutory obligations.76 
In the context of claims against auditors, Section 10(b) can represent a 
significant risk of liability to accountants and other professionals involved in 
securities transactions. Since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ersnt & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, the fundamental challenge to a plaintiff in a Section 10(b) action was to 
prove scienter.77 
Given the specific mandate of the public accounting firm, how would courts 
apply the scienter concept to an auditor?  In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the 
Supreme Court defined scienter as an “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,”78 
but also indicated it was willing to extend the concept of scienter to two other 
possible views, one focused on the requirement of “actual knowledge of 
misstatements, irrespective of intent,”79 and another view focused on manifest 
reckless conduct, which “is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for 
purposes of imposing liability for some act.”80  This wide spectrum of potential 
interpretations left little guidance for both the plaintiffs and the defendants, as well 
 
 74.  See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).  (“Although the verbal formulations of 
the standard to be applied have varied, several Courts of Appeals have held in substance that negligence alone is 
sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 (internal citations omitted). Other Courts of Appeals 
have held that some type of scienter - i.e., intent to defraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing use of 
some practice to defraud - is necessary in such an action (internal citations omitted). In this opinion the term 
‘scienter’ refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of the law 
recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. 
We need not address here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil 
liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”). 
 75.  See AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 209 (2d Cir. 2000) (distinguishing transaction 
causation, where the misrepresentations caused the plaintiff to engage in a transaction, from loss causation, 
which requires a finding that the unlawful conduct was the proximate cause of the economic harm). 
 76.  See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10863, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2003) 
(“The requisite state of mind, or scienter, in an action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, that the plaintiff 
must allege is an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.” (quoting Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 138 (2d 
Cir. 2001))). 
 77.  See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201 (“[Section] 10 (b) was addressed to practices that involve some 
element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negligent conduct alone.”). 
 78.  Id. at 193. 
 79.  Id. at 197; see Elaine E. Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule 10B-5: Ernst 
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213, 219 n.31 (1977) (explaining that the existing jurisprudence 
recognizes that the language of Section 10(b) covers both knowing or intentional misconduct, i.e. that 
knowledge of the misconduct was sufficient to establish scienter). 
 80.  Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12. 
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as for federal courts.81 This lack of guidance generated significant differences and 
circuit splits, which were compounded by the passage of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”).82 
C. The Impact of the PSLRA 
It is the pleading requirement of the PSLRA applied to the intent element which has 
created much controversy and has become the critical factor used by courts to 
dismiss cases early in the litigation process as it relates to auditors.83  Following a 
perceived increase of frivolous securities fraud suits aimed at extracting quick 
settlements using Section 10(b)-based claims, Congress passed the PSLRA to ensure 
that the heavy burden of discovery processes under federal securities law against 
corporations and their external auditors would be limited.84  The main procedural 
tool designed by Congress to correct this perceived inequity was to create a 
significant exception to the liberal notice-pleading doctrine of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure by imposing heightened pleading requirements for securities fraud  
 
 
 
 81.  See Bucklo, supra note 80, at 226–27 (“Although the Supreme Court initially attempted to define 
scienter in concrete, categorical terms, an analysis of its subsequent language reveals considerable confusion as 
to the degree of culpability that the Court intended to require a plaintiff seeking damages under rule 10b-5 to 
plead and prove. In fact, the Court’s opinion in Ernst & Ernst is susceptible of being read to support any of three 
definitions of scienter—intent, knowledge or recklessness. The Court’s analysis of Section 10(b)’s language, 
history and especially its interdependence with other federal securities provisions indicates that it clearly would 
include intentional misrepresentation and almost certainly knowledge in its definition of scienter, leaving the 
sufficiency of recklessness in question. On the recklessness question, the opinion provided enough support for 
both sides of the issue to justify taking the Court at its word as to the openness of that issue.”). 
 82.  See discussion infra note 84. 
 83.  Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the PSLRA, 39 CONN. L. REV. 
1097, 1101 (2007). 
 84.  See Kevin P. Roddy, Nine Years of Practice and Procedure Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995, in POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW: ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 749, 
756, available at Westlaw SL020 ALI-ABA 749, 756 (2005) (“The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (“PSLRA”) was enacted by Congress on December 22, 1995 over President Clinton’s veto. Several district 
courts have stated that the PSLRA was intended ‘to combat the filing of abusive and meritless lawsuits.’ 
(quoting Carson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6903, at *10 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 
30, 1998))); see also David S. Escoffery, A Winning Approach To Loss Causation Under Rule 10b-5 In Light of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1781, 1810–1813 (2000) (explaining in the 
legislative history of the PSLRA, the lobbying role of the public accounting firms and the committee negotiation 
process in both houses of Congress); Charles M. Yablon, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and Private 
Securities Litigation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 572 (2000) (arguing that the PSLRA discourages valid fraud claims 
from being brought); see generally Sanford P. Dumain, Accountants’ Liability, Class Action Suits, Auditor 
Liability, and the Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in ACCOUNTANTS’ LIABILITY: ALI-
ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 205 (2006), available at Westlaw SL064 ALI-ABA 205. 
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claims.85 To successfully bring a Section 10(b) action, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a 
misleading statement or omission of a material fact; (2) made in connection with 
the purchase or sale of securities; (3) with intent to defraud or recklessness; (4) 
reliance; and (5) damages.”86  It is the pleading of the intent element which has 
created much controversy and has become the critical factor used by courts to 
dismiss cases early in the litigation process.87  To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
plaintiff must allege with particularity sufficient facts, which will allow the court to 
establish a “strong inference” of scienter.88  Under the PSLRA pleading requirement, 
which forces the plaintiff to make particular factual allegations, a court will grant 
the motion to dismiss if the allegations in the complaint are general or “conclusory 
in nature.”89  Under the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence,90 the basic requirement 
used to evaluate the state of mind of external auditors is that plaintiffs must prove 
“that the accounting practices were so deficient that the audit amounted to no audit 
at all, or an egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate the doubtful, or 
that the accounting judgments made were such that no reasonable accountant 
would have made the same decisions if confronted with the same facts.”91  Similarly, 
at the pleading stage, plaintiffs, to allege scienter, must include in the complaint 
specific facts showing that the audit deficiencies were “so severe that they strongly 
suggest that the auditor must have been aware of the corporation’s fraud.”92 This 
heightened pleading requirement has been recognized to be a strong barrier to 
securities fraud claims involving external auditors,93 and the federal jurisprudence 
in all circuits has shown that it has become more difficult to plead scienter against 
external auditors than against corporate insiders, and that the threshold against an 
 
 85.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2012) (“the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been 
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement 
or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which 
that belief is formed”); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2012) (“the complaint shall, with respect to each act or 
omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind.”). 
 86.  Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 87.  Gideon, supra note 79. 
 88.  In re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litig., 426 F. Supp. 2d 688, 717–18 (S.D. Ohio 2006). 
 89.  Id. at 737. 
 90.  See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
 91.  PR Diamonds Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 693–94 (6th
 
Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Worlds of Wonder 
Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1426 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 92.  Cardinal Health, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 764 (citing PR Diamonds Inc., 364 F.3d at 694)). 
 93.  See Edward P. Leibensperger & Lauren M. Papenhausen, Auditor Liability For Securities Fraud After the 
PSLRA and Sarbanes-Oxley, 28 ALI-ABA BUS. L. COURSE MATERIALS J. 15, 18 (2004) (“The heightened pleading 
requirement of the Reform Act is particularly difficult to meet in cases brought against auditors. A developing 
line of Reform Act cases recognizes that it is more difficult to plead scienter with respect to independent 
auditors than to corporate insiders. Courts have often dismissed securities fraud complaints against auditors 
even where the complaints have adequately pled claims alleging accounting improprieties against the auditors’ 
client.”).  
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external auditor is higher than for the insider defendant, making it more difficult to 
plead scienter against external auditors than against corporate insiders.94 
Because the PSLRA did not precisely define the required state of mind or provide 
a standard as to whether a strong inference of that state of mind has been pled 
adequately, various circuit courts have differed in their application of the PSLRA’s 
scienter pleading requirements.95 While the Second and Third Circuits found that 
circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s “motive and opportunity” were 
sufficient to properly infer scienter, the Ninth Circuit rejected this “motive and 
opportunity” test and adopted a conservative reading of the Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder view of intent, by requiring that plaintiffs “must state facts that come 
closer to demonstrating intent, as opposed to mere motive and opportunity.”96 
Between these two extreme views across the possible interpretations of the 
Supreme Court’s scienter standard, the Sixth Circuit endorsed the “recklessness-
only” view of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.  Although the Sixth Circuit rejected the 
“motive and opportunity” test by holding that “the bare pleading of motive and 
opportunity does not, standing alone, constitute the pleading of a strong inference 
of scienter,”97 a plaintiff may establish scienter by alleging recklessness, defined as 
“highly unreasonable conduct” representing “an extreme departure from the 
standards of ordinary care,” which is akin to “conscious disregard.”98  The threshold 
analysis required by the Sixth Circuit “differs from the Ninth Circuit in that it has 
left open the possibility that detailed allegations of motive and opportunity might 
be sufficient if they ‘simultaneously establish that the defendant acted recklessly or 
knowingly, or with the requisite state of mind.’”99  To attempt to apply these various 
approaches objectively, the various federal circuits established a number of different 
 
 94.  Id. (“Courts have found that auditors warrant different treatment from corporate insiders for purposes 
of pleading scienter because they have less to gain (in terms of stock options or fees) and more to lose (in terms 
of their professional reputation) than do corporate insiders.”). 
 95.  See generally Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, Split Widens on Scienter Pleading Standard Under 
the PSLRA, FINDLAW.COM (Mar. 26, 2008), http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Se p/1/127316.html (summarizing 
each circuit’s handling of the scienter requirement). 
 96.  In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the PSLRA requires 
plaintiff to plead “deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct”). 
 97.  In re Comshare Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 98.  See id. at 550; see also Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir. 1979). 
Although there are some similarities between the Sixth Circuit’s approach and the standard adopted by the 
Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit has not gone so far as to require a securities fraud plaintiff to allege “deliberate 
recklessness.” 
 99.  Robert W. Perrin, Brian T. Glennon & Julie R.F. Gerchik, The State of Scienter: A Comparative Survey 
Ten Years After the Enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, LEGALWORKS, Dec.-Jan. 2006, at 4 
(quoting Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024 (6th Cir. 1979)). See Christopher M. 
Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 606–07 (2002); see also Dumain, supra note 80, at 221 (“The 
Sixth Circuit has taken a middle course, holding that scienter could be alleged by pleading facts that give rise to 
a strong inference of recklessness, but refusing to accept the proposition that allegations of motive and 
opportunity to commit fraud were sufficient to plead scienter, unless the facts demonstrate the required state of 
mind, namely that the defendant acted recklessly or knowingly.”). 
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approaches: While the Second and Third Circuits focused on an analysis of the 
motive and opportunity of defendants, the Sixth Circuit relied on the so-called 
“Helwig” factors, first identified in Helwig v. Vencor, Inc.,100 which enumerates 
objective factors used to establish scienter in securities fraud actions.101 
Another example of the confusion between the circuits is the type of facts 
required in a PSLRA pleading.  For instance, a recurring question is whether 
significant violations of GAAP and GAAS principles are sufficient on their own to 
establish a strong inference of scienter on the part of the outside auditor.  In most 
circuits, it has been well-established that alleging a violation of GAAP or GAAS is 
not sufficient, by itself, to establish a strong inference of scienter on the part of an 
outside auditor, even if the auditor is grossly negligent in carrying out its 
responsibilities.102  Rather, courts usually require additional evidence of intent or 
recklessness, such as facts placing a reasonable auditor on notice of wrongdoing, 
which the auditor chose to ignore, usually called “red flags.”103  However, it is clear 
that the circuit split regarding the facts necessary to establish scienter under the 
PSLRA shows that no consensus exists as to the level of recklessness required to 
reach a minimum threshold necessary to fall within the Ernst & Ernst standard.104 
 
 100.  Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 552 (6th
 
Cir. 2001) (en banc), abrogated by Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor 
Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323–24 (2007). 
 101.  Id. (establishing the “Helwig” factors as: “(1) insider trading at a suspicious time or in an unusual 
amount; (2) divergence between internal reports and external statements on the same subject; (3) closeness in 
time of an allegedly fraudulent statement or omission and the later disclosure of inconsistent information; (4) 
evidence of bribery by a top company official; (5) existence of an ancillary lawsuit charging fraud by a company 
and the company’s quick settlement of that suit; (6) disregard of the most current factual information before 
making statements; (7) disclosure of accounting information in such a way that its negative implications could 
only be understood by someone with a high degree of sophistication; (8) the personal interest of certain 
directors in not informing disinterested directors of an impending sale of stock; and (9) the self-interested 
motivation of defendants in the form of saving their salaries or jobs”). The reason Helwig is often cited is that it 
is the only case that attempts to define specific objective factors in the scienter analysis rather than subjective 
criteria such as an auditor’s motives. 
 102.  See Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Allegations of a violation of GAAP 
provisions or SEC regulations, without corresponding fraudulent intent, are not sufficient to state a securities 
fraud claim.”); see also Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1994) (“boilerplate averments that the 
accountants violated particular accounting standards are not, without more, sufficient to support inferences of 
fraud”); Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that allegations concerning 
violations of general accounting principles were insufficient to properly plead securities fraud in conformance 
with Rule 9(b)); Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp., No. 98-6879-CIV-GOLD, 2000 WL 1140306, at *11 (S.D. Fla. 
July 31, 2000) (“Courts uniformly hold that allegations of GAAP and GAAS violations are insufficient, without 
more, to state a securities fraud claim.”); Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 182 F.R.D. 370, 375 (D. Mass. 1998) 
(scienter cannot be established by “generalized allegations of violations”). Indeed, GAAP or GAAS violations 
may show that an auditor or accountant was grossly negligent, however, without more, there cannot be a strong 
inference of scienter. See Reiger v. Altris Software, No. 98-CV-528-TW-JFS, 1999 WL 540893, at *7 (S.D. Cal. 
April 30. 1999) (“[A]llegations that an accountant or auditor conducted an inadequate audit by violating 
accounting or auditing principles do not, without more, adequately plead a strong inference of scienter.”). 
 103.  See In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1026, 1030, 1033 (N.D. Ohio 2000); see also 
infra note 221and accompanying text (defining “red flag”). 
 104.  See Bucklo, supra note 80, at 226.  
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The PLSRA introduced several other requirements, both substantive and 
procedural, designed to prevent frivolous lawsuits from being filed, which have a 
significant impact on claims against public accounting firms.105 On the substantive 
side, the PSLRA replaced the joint and several liability under recklessness or 
negligence claims with proportionate liability.106 Procedurally, the main change 
impacting claims against auditors are the appointment of a lead plaintiff107 and a 
required stay of discovery, where the discovery is stayed during the pendency of a 
motion to dismiss.108 Additionally, the PSLRA codifies standards providing that 
financial statement audits required under the securities laws must include 
procedures designed to provide a reasonable assurance of detecting material illegal 
acts. This codification describes how the auditor, upon the discovery of illegal acts, 
must inform the issuer’s management, and if an illegal act is determined to have a 
material effect on the financial statements, and if senior management fails to take 
appropriate remedial actions, how the auditor must report to the board of directors 
and to the SEC.109 These new provisions and associated SEC rules did show that 
Congress, even before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, identified an increased affirmative 
disclosure obligations of the auditor to the entity and the SEC regarding material 
misrepresentations imbedded in the financial statements. 
 
 
 
 
 105.  Dumain, supra note 80, at 210. 
 106.  The PSLRA imposes several other substantive changes, including heightened pleading requirements 
for material misrepresentations and for the defendant’s state of mind, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) to (2) (2012), 
specific calculation rules for the measure of damages based on objectively measured stock price points, 15 
U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(4) (2012), the codification of the loss causation rule, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2012), an 
enhancement to the safe-harbor protection for forward-looking statements by issuers, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 
(2012), and the preserving of aiding and abetting claims by the SEC under section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 
(2012). For proportionate liability, the PSLRA replaces traditional joint and several liability by proportionate 
liability for claims based on “non-knowing” conduct against outside directors under Section 11 of the 1933 Act 
and against all persons for claims under the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g) (2012). 
 107.  Within 90 days of publication of the notice, the court appoints a lead plaintiff from among those who 
have filed a complaint or moved to serve as lead plaintiff, usually the person(s) having the largest financial 
interest in the case. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3), 78u-4(a)(3) (2012).  
 108.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b), 78u-4(b) (2012) (“In any private action arising under this chapter, all 
discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless the court 
finds upon the motion of any party that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent 
undue prejudice to that party.”); see also Brian Philip Murray, Lifting the PSLRA “Automatic Stay” Of Discovery, 
80 N.D. L. REV. 405, 405 (2004) (suggesting that the automatic stay rule may not have the destructive effect the 
plaintiff’s bar claimed the rule had on valid suits because courts increasingly lift the stay).  
 109.  Section 301 of the PSLRA added new Section 10A to the 1934 Act, which requires auditors to adopt 
procedures that will give reasonable assurance of detecting illegal acts and that will identify related-party 
transactions.  The SEC has adopted rules, effective April 17, 1997, to implement Section 10A. See 
Implementation of Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC Release No. 34-38387, 62 Fed. Reg. 
12,743, 12,748 (Mar. 12, 1997) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240 (2011). 
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D. Primary Liability for Secondary Actors under Section 10(b) 
Public accounting firms may only face liability for securities fraud in a Section 
10(b) claim if the plaintiff successfully pleads that the auditor was a primary 
perpetrator of securities fraud.110  In Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank 
of Denver,111 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal securities laws impose 
liability only on primary perpetrators of securities fraud, and do not create liability 
against secondary actors, who usually are bankers, auditors, or attorneys, for aiding 
and abetting primary violations.112  Therefore, claims, which would only describe an  
auditor conspiring to assist a corporate insider to defraud investors, would not face 
liability under Section 10(b).113 
Although distinguishing between a primary actor and a secondary actor can be 
difficult, most courts agree that while the primary violator is the one who violates a 
prohibited act set forth by the statute, the secondary violator, although not 
performing the prohibited act, has responsibility for it if he or she assists or has a 
relationship with the primary violator.114 Another circuit split emerged as to how to 
determine whether an auditor, usually held to be a secondary actor, can be held 
liable under Section 10(b) under one of two primary liability theories. Some courts 
followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit by applying a “substantial participation” or 
“intricate involvement” standards, where an auditor may be held liable under 
Section 10(b) if the auditor was “substantially involved” in the misrepresentations 
or omissions in the financial statements which supported the fraud.115  Other courts, 
 
 110.  See Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1224 n.8 (10th. Cir. 1996) (“therefore, 
aiding and abetting a § 10(b) violation cannot be the basis of liability in private actions still before the courts” 
(citing James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991))). “The absence of § 10(b) aiding and 
abetting liability does not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from liability 
under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a 
manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities 
relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability 
under Rule 10b-5 are met.” Id. at 1224.  
 111.  See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191–92 (1994). 
 112.  Id. at 191.  
 113.  See Mary M. Wynne, Primary Liability Amongst Secondary Actors: Why The Second Circuit’s “Bright 
Line” Standard Should Prevail, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1607, 1611–12 (2000); see generally William H. Kuehnle, 
Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws-Aiding and Abetting Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and 
Agency: Common-Law Principles and the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313 (1989) (defining conspiracy 
liability and providing background information on the issue).  
 114.  See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 115.  See Wynne, supra note 109, at 1613–14.  For authority on “substantial participation,” see, for example, 
In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding an accounting firm’s 
substantial participation in drafting and editing misleading letters to the SEC was sufficient to support claim of 
primary liability); Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that 
plaintiffs could allege primary liability against accountant based upon various statements and reports issued by 
company); Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425, 433 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that primary 
liability can be based on accounting firm’s central role in drafting misleading statements); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. 
Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that an auditor may be primarily liable for securities 
fraud even if false statements could not be reasonably attributed to it). 
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following the Second Circuit, developed a more restrictive approach, by applying a 
so-called “bright line” standard, whereby liability for secondary actors, like 
auditors, will only be found when the defendant actually made a fraudulent 
misstatement or omission and such a misstatement or omission can be attributed to 
them.116  Yet the Second Circuit developed a third approach by considering the 
auditor as a primary actor in a Section 10(b) claim, and by holding that the auditor 
has a duty to correct its certified opinion.  In Overton v. Todman,117 the Second 
Circuit, by expanding the duty owed by auditors in their certification to all 
shareholders who rely on their opinion, is essentially transforming the auditor into 
a primary actor of a potential fraud or misrepresentation. 
In Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,118 the U.S. Supreme 
Court cited and reaffirmed its decision in Central Bank.119 The court reaffirmed that 
there is no private right of action for aiding and abetting a Section 10(b) violation.120 
The Court notes that the decision in Central Bank led to calls for Congress to create 
an express cause of action for aiding and abetting, but even though then-SEC 
Chairman Arthur Levitt recommended that aiding and abetting liability in private 
claims be established, Congress did not follow this course.121 Section 10(b) right of 
action does not extend to aiders and abettors, unless the conduct of the secondary 
actor satisfies each of the elements or preconditions for liability.122 
Therefore, for Section 10(b) claims against auditors, plaintiffs still have to defeat 
the heightened pleading requirement created by the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995,123 have to plead primary violations, and have to defeat a 
number of evidentiary challenges when using financial information audited by the 
public accounting firm. 
 
 
 
 116.  See In re MTC Elec. Techs. S’holders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[I]f Central Bank 
is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actually make a false or misleading statement in order to be held 
liable under Section 10(b). Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and abetting, and no matter how 
substantial that aid may be, it is not enough to trigger liability under Section 10(b).”); see also Wright v. Ernst & 
Young, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A] secondary actor cannot incur primary liability under the Act for 
a statement not attributed to the actor.”). 
 117.  478 F.3d 479 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 118.  128 S.Ct. 761 (2008). 
 119.  See id. at 768.  
 120.  Id. at 767.  
 121.  Id. at 768-9; S. Hearing No. 103-759, pp. 13-14(1994).  
 122.  Id. at 769. The plaintiff must prove the following elements or preconditions to extend liability to 
secondary actors:”(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection 
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the 
misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.” Id. at 768. 
 123.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).  
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E. How should the scienter analysis be applied to the facts pled? 
Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 provides that the auditor must 
“attest to, and report on, management’s assessment of the company’s internal 
control structure and procedures.”124 Therefore, since 2002, courts struggled with 
reconciling the increase in liability due to the failure in the new certification 
obligations and the PSLRA heightened pleading requirement language. 
The approach towards analyzing the pleaded facts individually or collectively is 
critical in ensuring that the proper legal standard is applied to a claim.  Prior to the 
passage of the PSLRA, plaintiffs in securities fraud claims attempted to satisfy their 
burden of pleading scienter by “alleging that a series of concededly true statements, 
taken together, or as a ‘mosaic,’ gave a false impression to the market as a result of 
alleged omissions.”125  However, the PSLRA has been interpreted as rejecting this 
approach, because the statutory language states, “each statement alleged to have 
been misleading.” The wording was thought to require that the heightened pleading 
requirement as well as the strong inference of scienter would be driven by each 
allegation or statement on its own.126  Consequently, the so-called “mosaic theory” 
was thought to be rejected by Congress.127  However, this view was premature.  A 
number of decisions across the country demonstrate that the courts are showing a 
renewed interest in the approach. 
The mosaic theory concept first made a comeback in the judicial review of the 
materiality element in Section 10(b) claims where “each individual piece of 
information at issue must be evaluated in the context of the overall impression 
created by the statements as a whole.”128 
Courts then extended their renewed interest with the mosaic theory approach to 
the scienter pleading requirement analysis.  In Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc.,129 
although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the finding that 
scienter was insufficiently pleaded as to individual statements, the court observed 
that, “[w]hile the district court did a detailed analysis of the Appellants’ separate 
arguments for scienter,” the “allegations of scienter must be collectively 
considered,” whereby, “[b]eyond each individual allegation we also consider 
‘whether the total of plaintiffs’ allegations, even though individually lacking, are 
sufficient to create a strong inference that defendants acted with deliberate or 
 
 124.  15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2007).  
 125.  Richard L. Jacobson & Joshua R. Martin, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: A Survey 
of the First Three Years, in SECURITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING AND STRATEGIES: A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 
MATERIALS  861, 865 (1999). 
 126.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1), 78u-4(b)(2) (2012).   
 127.  The term “mosaic theory” is a generic term used in many unrelated fields but in the US legal context, 
“mosaic theory” is used synonymously with the “totality of the circumstances” test. 
 128.  Phillip Wesley Lambert, Worlds Are Colliding: A Critique of the Need for the Additional Criminal 
Securities Fraud Section in Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 839, 848 (2003).  
 129.  339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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conscious recklessness.”130 Because the trial court did not apply the “totality of the 
allegations” test, the Court of Appeals remanded the case.131  Again, the mosaic 
theory proved critical in the Eleventh Circuit Lattice decision,132 where the District 
Court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss a securities fraud class action.  The 
Lattice court concluded that plaintiffs as a whole raised a strong inference that 
defendants acted with scienter because even though GAAP violations considered 
individually were not necessarily indicative of scienter, the significance of them, 
along with a long list of other specific claims,133 when viewed in the totality of the 
allegations added additional weight to the inference of scienter. 
Similarly, in In re Rent-Way Securities Litigation,134 the court found that plaintiffs’ 
allegations against the external auditor, Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC), supported 
an inference of scienter because all the allegations put together collectively gave rise 
to a strong inference of recklessness at least.135  Plaintiffs claimed that PwC’s scienter 
could be inferred from the magnitude and duration of the fraud, which had a 
considerable impact on the stock price, PwC’s “serial violations” of GAAP and 
GAAS,136 PwC’s knowledge that Rent-Way’s internal accounting structure and 
controls were inadequate,137 and PwC’s disregard for a number of “red flags.”138  The 
Rent-Way court noted that none of the individual allegations, standing alone, 
would be sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement, however, when combined 
with “red flags,” the allegations here satisfied the pleading standard of the PSLRA,139 
and the court concluded that the allegations supported a strong inference of 
scienter.140 
The re-emergence of the mosaic theory in the application of the PSLRA 
heightened pleading requirement has a significant impact on how to weigh a 
Section 404(b) certification in the scienter analysis.  Federal courts will no longer be 
able to analyze a Section 404(b) certification in isolation and conclude whether the 
 
 130.  Id. at 940 (quoting No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. America West 
Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 938 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 131.  Id. at 940–41.  
 132.  In re Lattice Semiconductor Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV04-1255-AA, 2006 WL 538756, at *19 (D. Or. 
Jan. 3, 2006).  
 133.  Id. at *19–20 (noting that the additional allegations included the design and operation of the 
company’s internal controls, which were the subject of the Sarbanes-Oxley certifications, the defendants’ alleged 
motive to inflate the company stock to avoid a goodwill write-off, the desire to keep newly issued options 
“above water,” and to maximize executives bonuses). 
 134.  209 F. Supp. 2d 493 (W.D. Pa. 2002). 
 135.  Id. at 511.  
 136.  Id. at 506. 
 137.  Id. at 508. 
 138.  Id. at 508–509 (noting that the specific allegations include Rent-Way’s weak internal accounting 
controls, improperly functioning software systems, manually adjusted general ledger entries, and declining 
expense ratios during a period of growth). 
 139.  Id.  
 140.  Id. at 507, 509, 511.  
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certification is a stand-alone “silver bullet,”141 but rather will have to draw the 
appropriate inferences from the certification and analyze this inference collectively 
with other inferences drawn from other parts of the complaint.  This approach was 
effectively endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Tellabs v. Makor.142 
 
F. A partial resolution of the scienter analysis circuit split: Tellabs v. Makor 
 
On June 21, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court provided decisive guidance in resolving 
the circuit split which had developed since 1995 regarding the proper analysis of the 
scienter requirement in a Section 10(b) claim.143  In Tellabs, the U.S. Supreme Court 
developed a framework for federal courts to evaluate whether a plaintiff did “state 
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required state of mind.”144  By vacating the opinion of the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals, Justice Ginsburg rejected the notion that strong inference was 
met if the particularized facts could lead a “reasonable man” to infer that the 
defendant acted with the required intent, which was a lower threshold than the 
“most plausible of competing inferences” standard advocated by the Sixth and 
Second circuits.145 The Tellabs decision provides several directions which are critical 
to the auditor’s liability risk in the context of a Section 404(b) certification. 
First, the Tellabs decision seems to provide a framework for scienter analysis for 
both insiders and secondary actors, such as auditors.  There is no attempt by the 
court to differentiate the analysis based on the type of defendants, which has been a 
consistent approach by the U.S. Supreme Court every time the issue of scienter has 
been reviewed.146  Therefore, the Tellabs approach will become the framework for 
future cases involving auditor liability under Section 10(b). 
Second, the Tellabs court provides its understanding of the strong inference of 
scienter requirement, by confirming that courts should only be looking indicia of 
“strong” or “powerful or cogent” inferences, meaning “‘[p]owerful to demonstrate 
or convince.”147 Therefore, the Tellabs court abandoned the notion that the PSLRA 
 
 141.  See MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1093 (10th ed. 1993) (“silver bullet: Something that 
acts as a magical weapon; esp one that instantly solves a long-standing problem”). 
 142.  551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
 143.  Id. at 319–20, 322–23. 
 144.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2012). 
 145.  Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2004).   
 146.  The only three cases where the scienter element in Section 10(b) claims was part of the central holding 
are Tellabs v. Makor, 551 U.S. 308, 322– 23 (2007), Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976), and 
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701–02 (1980) (which holds that the scienter requirement applies to injunction 
proceedings brought by the SEC). 
 147.  Tellabs v. Makor, 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007) (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 949 (2d ed. 1989) 
(defining “strong”)).  
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was meant to filter complaints which included facts able to raise the strongest or the 
most plausible of inferences. 
Third, the Tellabs court provided realistic guidance to federal courts by 
recognizing that the strength of that inference can not be tested in a vacuum, and 
actually prescribes a clear step-by-step approach: 
First, faced with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a §10(b) action, courts 
must, as with any motion to dismiss for failure to plead a claim on which 
relief can be granted, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as 
true. . . Second, courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as 
other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the 
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial 
notice. . . Third, in determining whether the pleaded facts give rise to a 
‘strong’ inference of scienter, the court must take into account plausible 
opposing inferences. . . The inquiry is inherently comparative: How likely is 
it that one conclusion, as compared to others, follows from the underlying 
facts? To determine whether the plaintiff has alleged facts that give rise to 
the requisite ‘strong inference’ of scienter, a court must consider plausible 
non-culpable explanations for the defendant’s conduct, as well as inferences 
favoring the plaintiff. The inference that the defendant acted with scienter 
need not be irrefutable, i.e., of the ‘smoking-gun’ genre, or even the most 
plausible of competing inferences.148 
Once all proper competing inferences are drawn on the basis of the complaint 
and the competing motions, a court should conclude “[a] complaint will survive. . . 
only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least 
as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”149 
Fourth, the Tellabs decision resolves a critical aspect of the pleading questions 
which arose after the passage of the PLSRA.  Prior to Tellabs, it was not clear to a 
court whether each fact pled by the plaintiff needed to satisfy the strong inference of 
scienter requirement separately, or whether the mosaic theory should be the 
governing approach.150  Clearly, the language of the court resolves this question by 
incorporating the mosaic theory in the legal framework federal courts must use in 
the scienter analysis by noting that all inferences must be considered in evaluating a 
 
 148.  Id. at 322–24. 
 149.  Id. at 324.  
 150.  See Danniella Casseres, Comment, South Cherry Street, LLC v. Hennessee Group LLC: Investors’ 
Desperate Plea for Second Circuit Standards, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 231, 241–43 (2011) (discussing the varying 
standards adopted by different circuits regarding the pleading of scienter). 
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complaint under the PSLRA, those favorable and unfavorable to the plaintiff.151 
Based on this analysis, the court endorsed the approach already adopted by the Fifth 
and Ninth Circuits which stressed “when determining whether plaintiffs have 
shown a strong inference of scienter, the court must consider all reasonable 
inferences,”152 and that on such motions, when determining whether a strong 
inference of scienter has been pled, district courts should “make an individualized 
assessment that sweeps before it the totality of the facts in a given case.”153 
Fifth, Justice Ginsburg confirmed the burden to the plaintiff in the motion to 
dismiss, which consisted of providing enough particularized facts enabling the 
“strong inference of scienter” to comply with a preponderance of the evidence 
burden, because “a plaintiff is not forced to plead more than she would be required 
to prove at trial.”154 
The Tellabs decision provides a new framework for federal courts to apply a 
scienter analysis of Section 10(b) securities fraud claims.  As applied to the public 
accounting industry, the Tellabs framework represents a significant change which 
will require courts to modify their approach in concluding at the pre-trial motion 
to dismiss stage whether a plaintiff satisfied the PSLRA heightened pleading 
requirement.  To do so, a circuit court will have to draw all proper inferences, then 
conclude whether a “reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent 
and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts 
alleged.”155 
This new test is significantly different than the Ninth Circuit motive and 
opportunity approach and rejects the most plausible inference approach from the 
Second Circuit.  Rather the Tellabs decision tends to support the Sixth Circuit’s 
approach, and abandons any subjective factor such as the defendant’s motive or 
opportunity.156 
 
 
 
 151.  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324. 
 152.  Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 153.  In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).  Federal 
courts have been quick to endorse the totality of circumstances test pronounced in Tellabs. See Middlesex 
Retirement System v. Quest Software Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“[u]nder Tellabs and 
Gompper the Court must consider these facts in their totality”). 
 154.  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323, 328–29.  
 155.  Id. at 324.  
 156.  See Kevin P. Roddy, Nine Years of Practice and Procedure Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995, A.L.I. 36–40 (July 8, 2005), http://www.wilentz.com/files/articlesandpublicationsfilefiles/82/article 
publicationfile/roddywebsiteattachmentjune2005.pdf (describing a number of cases in the Second Circuit 
applying the “motive and opportunity” formulation for pleading scienter).  
CIRIC (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2014  5:11 PM 
 Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place 
254 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
III. THE FEDERAL “COMMON LAW” STANDARD APPLIED TO 
AUDITORS NEEDS TO BE RECONCILED WITH THE SECTION 404(B) 
REQUIREMENTS 
A. The PCAOB Oversight 
The implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has had a significant impact on the 
public accounting firm: For the first time, the accounting industry is directly 
regulated by a private-sector non-profit organization, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (or PCAOB), which oversees registered public 
accounting firms and acts as a direct emanation of the SEC.157 Under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act,158 the SEC appoints the Board’s members after consultation with the 
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the 
Secretary of the Treasury.159 Unlike the prior oversight body (AIPCA), the budget of 
the PCAOB is approved by the SEC and is funded by feeds mostly paid by the U.S. 
issuers, which preserves independence from the accounting industry.160  Under 
Section 101 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the PCAOB is the entity entrusted to register 
public accounting firms that prepare audit reports, to set all of the auditing and 
ethical standards supporting the preparation of audit reports by issuers, and to 
conduct periodic inspections of the public accounting firms.161  Like the SEC, the 
PCAOB has the power to conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings 
against accounting firms or their partners, and may impose sanctions upon either 
the firms or associated persons.162 
In 2006, an accounting firm and a conservative non-profit group challenged the 
constitutionally of the PCAOB, on the grounds that the PCAOB violates separation-
of-powers principles, the Appointments Clause,163 and the non-delegation 
doctrine.164 In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
PCAOB, with the exception of the conditions for removal of Board members.165 
 
 
 157.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §101(a), 15 U.S.C. §7211(a) (2012).  
 158.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4) (2010). The SEC named the first Board members on October 25, 2002. The 
Act requires that two of the five Board members be or have been certified public accountants. The Act also 
requires that all members of the Board serve on a full-time basis. See http://www.pcaobus.org/About_the_ 
PCAOB/The_Board/index.aspx. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  2014 budget is $258.4 million, SEC Approves 2014 PCAOB Budget and Accounting Support Fee, (Feb. 
14, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540791494#.Uwu0f3lzrwI.  
 161.  See supra note 155. 
 162.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(4) (2010). 
 163.  See Free Enter. Fund v. The Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S.Ct. 3138 (2010). 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
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B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404(b) Requirements 
Section 404 represents the most controversial of Sarbanes-Oxley’s new obligations.  
Section 404(a) puts the burden on the issuer to attest that the annual report must 
contain an internal control report expressing two key outcomes, which are 
management’s acknowledgment of responsibility for establishing and maintaining 
adequate internal controls for financial reporting, and management’s assessment as 
to the effectiveness of the internal controls.166  Additionally, Section 404(b)167 puts 
the burden on the public accounting firm in charge of auditing the issuer’s financial 
statements to certify its independent evaluation of management’s assessment of  
internal controls.168  Under Section 404(b), the company’s auditors “shall attest to, 
and report on, the assessment made by the management of the issuer.”169  Pursuant 
to its newly created statutory power,170 and to ensure a uniform enforcement of this 
mandate, the PCAOB needed to implement this requirement on auditors via the 
publication of an Accounting Standard,171 which would allow the auditor to 
consistently implement the attestation and report required by Section 404(b).  To 
fulfill this obligation, on March 9, 2004, the PCAOB adopted Auditing Standard 
No. 2 (“AS 2”).172  This standard established the approaches an auditor must use to 
comply with section 404(b)’s attestation to management’s assessment of the 
 
 166.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (2012). 
 167.  15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2012). 
 168.  For the SEC’s view on the definition of the “Internal Control Over Financial Reporting,” see 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13a-15 (“The term internal control over financial reporting is defined as a process designed by, or under 
the supervision of, the issuer’s principal executive and principal financial officers, or persons performing similar 
functions, and effected by the issuer’s board of directors, management and other personnel, to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements 
for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and includes those policies 
and procedures that: 
(1) Pertain to the maintenance of records that in reasonable detail accurately and fairly reflect the transactions 
and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; 
(2) Provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial 
statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and that receipts and expenditures of 
the issuer are being made only in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of the issuer; 
and 
(3) Provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use or 
disposition of the issuer’s assets that could have a material effect on the financial statements.”). 
  169.  15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2012). 
 170.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 103(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1) (2007). Section 103(a)(1) directs the 
Board to establish auditing and related attestation standards to be used by registered public accounting firms, as 
may be necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors.  
 171.  Id. 
 172.  See PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2: AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL 
CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
(2004) [hereinafter AS 2], available at http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket008/2004-03-09_Release_ 
2004-001-all.pdf, effective pursuant to Order Approving Proposed Auditing Standard No. 2, Exchange Act 
Release No. 49,884, 69 Fed. Reg. 35,083 (S.E.C. June 17, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/pcaob/34-
49884.htm.  
CIRIC (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2014  5:11 PM 
 Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place 
256 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
effectiveness of its internal control. Under AS 2, the auditor must test the internal 
controls of the issuer in a systematic fashion through sampling methodologies, and 
to preserve the independence of the work and the certification of the auditor, 
cannot be involved in the controls performed by the issuer.173  The goal of this 
process is to ensure that the auditor obtains a full understanding of the operating 
effectiveness of the internal controls systems of the issuer, and may express a proper 
opinion on the effectiveness of the internal controls systems and on management’s 
assessment of their effectiveness.174  Beyond the compliance costs involved in these 
testing processes, this standard creates a number of obligations which have the 
potential to greatly impact the legal liability of the auditor in the future. 
First, unlike prior auditing standards issued by the ICPA, whereby the auditor 
was allowed enormous discretion in the size and extent of the testing process 
performed by the auditor to audit financial transactions, Section 404(b) along with 
AS 2, requires the auditor to engage in a complete and full-scale control audit of 
enough transaction and processes to enable him to certify to effectiveness of the 
issuer’s control systems.175  In the context of a Section 10(b) cause of action against 
the auditor, this new approach may considerably diminish a defense of ignorance 
against the claim of knowledge required in the scienter analysis.176 Prior to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, because a financial audit was highly dependent upon the size 
and representativeness of the sampling performed during the audit, a defense of 
negligence was available to the auditor if the fraud or misrepresentation involved 
activities not covered in the sample of activities covered by the audit.  Under 
Section 404(b), the requirement of a complete coverage of all internal controls 
necessary for the auditor to comply with the certification considerably diminishes 
the availability of this defense.  Under Section 404(b), a defense of lack of actual 
knowledge by the auditor of a wrong, fraud, or misrepresentation could easily be 
countered with an inference of the auditor’s knowledge of the processes and 
controls of the issuer. 
Second, the approach of AS 2 creates a distinct obligation for the auditor to 
perform its own testing of the effectiveness of the internal control systems, rather 
than just relying on or endorsing the testing and the assessment of the issuer.177  
This approach will also render unavailable a defense of reliance on testing 
procedures and results originating from the entity, where the financial controls may 
 
 173.   Id. at §§ 51–52.  
 174.  Id. at §§ 153–155.  
 175.  Id. at §§ 150–51, 157. 
 176.  See Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling In The Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and The Implications of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1074 n.308 (2004). (“As auditors must now 
apprise the audit committee of the details of the internal controls, or lack thereof, ignorance is no longer a 
defense.”). 
 177.  AS 2, supra note 162, §§ 161–166. 
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have been deficient, insufficient, or in the worst case, designed to prevent finding a 
specific accounting fraud or financial misrepresentation. 
Third, the auditor now has an affirmative duty to disclose a material weakness or 
a significant deficiency in the internal controls of the issuer,178 which is a separate 
obligation from the requirement to issue an adverse opinion on the 
representativeness of the financial statements.179  The failure of the auditor to  
comply with this obligation to warn of the lack of effectiveness in the internal 
controls considerably increases its liability, at least vis-à-vis the PCAOB.180 
While the reliability of such warnings is the subject of an intense debate, the legal 
implications of these new requirements may be substantial. 
First, the primary impact of requiring the auditor to make an affirmative 
statement on the effectiveness of the financial controls that support the financial 
statements the auditor also certifies to is that the plaintiff investor’s attempt to 
make the auditor a primary actor will be greatly enhanced.  Any presumption that 
the auditor may not have been exposed to a material event which did not find its 
way into the financial statement, or that the auditor may not have been aware of 
significant financial fraudulent activities, will be considerably diminished.181  Under 
Stoneridge the risk to the auditor for failing to submit an affirmative statement may 
be reduced because a secondary actor is not liable for aiding and abetting under 
Section 10(b).182  However, the failure to submit an affirmative statement may 
continue to be indicia of fraud and expose the accountant to civil liability if the 
plaintiff can show that it relied upon the lack of affirmative statement, along with 
other deceptive acts.183 
In addition, the liability of the auditor may be increased in situations where the 
financial statements opinion and the internal control opinions diverge,184 most 
 
 178.  Id. at §§ 175–177. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  See Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections and Audits in the Post-SOX 
Environment, 86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 87 (2007) (“If a registered CPA firm does not cooperate with an investigation, 
the PCAOB may institute a disciplinary proceeding. Non-cooperation is evident if the CPA firm ‘failed to 
comply with [a PCAOB] demand, . . . knowingly made any false material declaration,’ or ‘abused the 
[PCAOB’s] processes for purposes of obstructing an investigation . . . .’ If it appears to the PCAOB that 
disciplinary proceedings are appropriate, the PCAOB must conduct a non-public hearing. Disciplinary cases 
from the PCAOB become public if the PCAOB makes a final determination, such as the imposition of 
sanctions. Permissible sanctions include temporarily suspending or permanently revoking registration, barring 
an individual from further association with a registered CPA firm, prohibiting a firm from accepting new audit 
clients for a period of time, or imposing significant civil monetary penalties.”). 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Stoneridge, 128 S.Ct. 761. 
 183.  Id. at 769.  
 184.  The auditor will deliver three separate opinions: the traditional opinion on the financial statements, 
and two opinions concerning internal controls (one commenting on management’s assertions pursuant to 
Section 404(b) and the other detailing the auditor’s own conclusions concerning internal control pursuant to 
Auditing Standard No. 2). See AS 2, supra note 168, §§ 207–211.  
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notably where a material weakness in internal controls is reported, but an 
unqualified opinion on the financial statements is submitted. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of the AS 2 obligations in the 1934 Act periodic 
reporting requirements ensures that the auditor certifications appear in periodic 
communications, and systematically provide valuable information to potential  
plaintiffs.185 This aspect is critical in the context of the PSLRA requirements, which 
prevents discovery at the pre-trial motion for summary judgment, because the 
plaintiff is forced to rely either on public information or on the results of its own 
investigations. 
C. The Implementation of the Section 404(b) Requirements through Accounting 
Standard No. 5 
In May 2007, following considerable criticism from the auditing industry, issuers, 
and small businesses, based on the Section 404 compliance costs, the PCAOB 
approved a new auditing standard to replace AS 2 with Auditing Standard No. 5 
(“AS 5”).186 AS 5 accomplishes two main changes which have a significant impact on 
the potential liability of auditors. 
The first change was the simplification of the Section 404(b) requirements, most 
notably by allowing the auditor to focus on the most material areas of internal 
controls, rather than an exhaustive testing requirement.187 Therefore, AS 5 
eliminates the requirement that the auditor must perform a walk-through for each 
significant process before selecting controls to test. This allows the auditor to select 
appropriate procedures based on the risk to financial statement assertions. Using 
this assessment, the auditor selects the controls to test and the procedures to use 
based on the risk of a material weakness.188  One could argue that this may improve 
the ignorance defense of the auditor because the auditor may forego an exhaustive 
testing process and could argue that some areas of the entity he did not investigate 
were the sources of the alleged fraud by plaintiffs. However, this argument will be 
ineffective because the burden remains on the auditor to select the areas which are 
 
 185.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §103(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §7213(a)(1) (2007). When, on June 17, 2004, 
the SEC issued its Order Approving Proposed Auditing Standard No. 2, see supra note 168, this order triggered 
the inclusion of the Auditing Standard 2 certification requirements in several SEC rules and forms which 
incorporate the certifications in periodic filings (e.g. section 2-02 of Regulation S-X requires the company’s 
registered public accounting firm to attest to management’s assessment of internal control over financial 
reporting in the annual report). 
 186.  PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., AUDITING STANDARD NO. 5: AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL 
OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING THAT IS INTEGRATED WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (2007) [hereinafter 
AS5], available at http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket%20021/2007-06-12_Release_No_2007-
005A.pdf, effective pursuant to Order Approving Proposed Auditing Standard No. 5, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-56152, 72 Fed. Reg. 42141 (S.E.C. July 27, 2007) [hereinafter AS5 Order], available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/pcaob/2007/34-56152.pdf. 
 187.   AS 5, supra note 186, §§ 46–47. 
 188.  Id.; see also AS 5 Order, supra note 186, at 42144. 
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appropriate to test any controls which have a material impact on the financial 
statements of the issuer.  Therefore, the ignorance defense will likely be eliminated 
by the affirmative obligation for the auditor to provide a substantially complete 
picture of the effectiveness of the internal controls on the basis of materiality. 
The second accomplishment of AS 5 is a formal definition endorsed by the 
PCAOB and the SEC of the concepts of “material weakness” and “significant 
deficiency.”  The SEC endorsed a clear definition of “material weakness,” which is 
“a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in ICFR [“internal control over 
financial reporting”] such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material 
misstatement of the registrant’s annual or interim financial statements will not be 
prevented or detected on a timely basis.”189  This new probability standard 
represents a significant change because it only requires a “reasonable possibility,” 
which is a higher standard than the previous requirement of a “more than a remote 
likelihood.”190  This change will strengthen the auditor’s defense because he will no 
longer be required to test every control which may have a small probability of 
having a material impact on the material misstatement of the registrant’s annual or 
interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis.  In 
addition, AS 5 requires management to disclose all “significant deficiencies” to the 
audit committee and external auditors.191 Unlike the definition of “material 
weakness,” the definition of “significant deficiency” does not specifically include a 
likelihood component but instead relies on the sufficient and appropriate judgment 
of management in deciding what deficiencies should be reported to the auditors 
and the audit committee.  Therefore, significant deficiencies are not necessarily 
material weaknesses, but are items which require disclosure only to the audit 
committee. 
Since AS 2, the identification of a “material weakness” by an auditor had 
considerable consequences, since its existence requires the auditors to deliver an 
adverse control opinion and to disclose this opinion to the financial markets.192 
Obviously, such an opinion is stigmatizing and likely to be negatively perceived by  
 
 189.  See Amendments to Rules Regarding Management’s Report on Internal Control Over Financial 
Reporting, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55928, 72 Fed. Reg. 35310, 35313–14 (S.E.C. June 20, 2007).  Following 
the approval of Auditing Standard No. 5, the SEC has amended Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act and Rule 1-02 
of Regulation S-X. 
 190.  Id.; AS 5, supra note 186, § A7. This definition abandons the “more than a remote likelihood that a 
material misstatement of the financials will not be prevented or detected” standard of AS 2.  AS 2, supra note 
172, § 10 (emphasis added). 
 191.  See 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(a)(4) (2013) ([whereas a significant deficiency is] “a deficiency, or a 
combination of deficiencies, in internal control over financial reporting that is less severe than a material 
weakness, yet important enough to merit attention by those responsible for oversight of the registrant’s 
financial reporting”). 
 192.  AS 5, supra note 186, at 10. 
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investors.193 Even if the stock market ignores the opinion, the one body that cannot 
be indifferent to it is the audit committee. Inherently, such an opinion places them 
on notice that the entity may not be able to produce accurate and reliable financial 
information, in which case significant liability under a duty of care violation theory 
could emerge.194 Because adverse opinions will be painful for all, it is predictable 
that auditors will seek to avoid rendering them. The simplest route to this end is for 
the auditor to decide that an internal control problem or irregularity amounts only 
to a “significant deficiency,” but not a “material weakness.” Separating these two 
types of weakness is only a matter of degree. According to AS 2, “significant 
deficiencies” pose “more than inconsequential” risks for financial statement 
reliability, while “material weaknesses” pose “material risks” for financial statement 
reliability. Much as the two may sound alike, they require very different responses 
from the auditor. “Material weaknesses” must be publicly disclosed and their nature 
and impact explained by the auditor, while “significant deficiencies” need only be 
brought to the attention of the audit committee.195 
Both AS 2 and AS 5 are likely to alter the securities fraud exposure of the auditor: 
prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, undetected material weaknesses in internal 
controls were not considered a threshold issue sufficient to raise and assign liability 
to the auditor.196 Courts generally found that scienter could not be inferred merely 
from the fact that the auditor relied on inadequate internal controls.197 This is the 
critical judicial assumption which will now be significantly challenged by the 
Section 404(b) requirement. First, the AS 5 requirement of an affirmative disclosure 
of a “material weakness” will likely limit or defeat ignorance-based defenses by 
auditors.  Additionally, because a statutory relationship now exists between the 
internal control deficiencies and the certification of the financial statements, the  
 
 
 193.  See Helen Shaw, Material-Weakness Reports Skyrocket, CFO.COM (Jul. 18, 2005), http://www.cfo.com/ 
printable/article.cfm/4193977?origin=archive.html (“A total of 586 companies reported material weaknesses 
through early May of this year, compared with 313 for all of 2004, according to shareholder-advisory firm Glass, 
Lewis & Co.”). 
 194.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., SOX Section 404 and Auditing Standard No.2: The New Disclosure Landscape, 
available at Westlaw SK017 ALI-ABA 531, 535–37 (2004) (“Obviously, such an opinion is stigmatizing and 
likely to be confusing to investors. Even if the stock market ignores the opinion, the one body that cannot be 
indifferent to it is the audit committee. Inherently, such an opinion places them on notice that the firm may not 
be capable of producing accurate and reliable financial information. If they do not move promptly to correct 
any control deficiency, they could be plausibly alleged to have violated their Caremark duty to monitor—at 
least if a later financial restatement or scandal arises. In addition, directors who do nothing in this context may 
be found not to have acted in ‘good faith’; recent Delaware decisions have tightened the definition of ‘good 
faith,’ which is a prerequisite for the availability of Section 102(b)(7)’s charter provision eliminating due care 
liability.”). 
 195.  AS5, supra note 186, at 10. 
 196.  See infra Part IV. 
 197.  See infra Part IV; see also infra Appendix 1. 
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circuit courts will have to take into account inferences created by the presence of a 
material weakness disclosure or by the absence of such a disclosure.198 
D. The impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley certifications on the federal case law. 
Following the implementation of AS 5, the question of the legal impact of these new 
certifications immediately surfaced in the federal case law.  However, the first 
decisions which analyzed the impact of these new obligations were limited to cases 
involving company insiders not public accounting firms.  In addition, as the 
frequency of Section 10(b) claims is disproportionately higher than Section 11 
claims,199 courts were first confronted with the impact of these new certifications on 
their potential value as evidence of scienter in Section 10(b) claims.  Courts 
recognized that the impact of a failure to meet the new certification obligations on 
the legal liability of the corporate insiders was unchartered territory, and recent 
decisions show mixed judicial views. 
In In re Watchguard, although recognizing that the impact of “a Sarbanes-Oxley 
certification has on a Rule 10b-5 claim is a relatively novel question,” the court 
refused to find that these certifications represented “a basis for a strong inference of 
scienter,” because the certifying Defendants [already] knew about [the] revenue 
recognition problems as a result of the accounting controls that they certified were 
in existence.”200 
In Garfield v. NDC Health,201 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
refused to recognize that scienter would be established in every case where there was 
an accounting error or auditing mistake made by a publicly traded company 
 
 198.  See Coffee, supra note 194, at 539 (“Traditionally, material weaknesses in internal controls were not 
considered material in their own right. Plaintiffs could still assert liability and satisfy their obligation to plead 
with particularity if they were able to show that in response to its discovery of material weakness in internal 
controls, the auditor failed to expand its substantive audit testing, as ‘generally accepted auditing standards’ 
required it to do. Similarly, the case law generally found that scienter could not be inferred merely from the fact 
that the auditor relied on inadequate internal controls. Rather, some connection needed to be shown between 
internal control deficiencies and its audit of the financial statements. If the auditor responded to its recognition 
of inadequate internal controls by expanding the scope of its audit testing, it was probably safe. 
All this changes after Auditing Standard No. 2. In Section 11 cases involving primary offerings, the plaintiffs 
who purchased registered securities need only show a material omission, and the burden would then shift to the 
defendant auditor to demonstrate that it satisfied its due diligence defense or that the investors’ loss was not 
causally related to the omission. Material weaknesses that once had to be reported only internally now have to 
be publicly disclosed. Although such an omission is not per se material, the odds are high that, in the typical 
case involving financial irregularities, it will enhance the settlement value of the plaintiffs’ case.”). 
 199.  See Securities Class Action Settlements 2002: A Year in Review, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 11 (2003), 
http://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2002-A-Year-In.  
Figure 10 (“Settlements by Nature of Allegations 2002 Settlements”) shows that approximately 7% of cases 
which led to a settlement in 2002 involve a section 11 claim, whereas approximately 90% of these cases included 
at least one Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim. 
 200.  In re Watchguard Sec. Litig., Master File No. C05-678JLR, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27217, at *29 (W.D. 
Wash. Apr. 21, 2006). 
 201.  466 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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because a possible “interpretation of Sarbanes-Oxley conflicts with the plain 
language of the PSLRA”,202 thereby eviscerating the pleading requirements for 
scienter set forth in the PSLRA.”203 However, the Garfield court did recognize that “a 
Sarbanes-Oxley certification is. . . probative of scienter if the person signing the 
certification was severely reckless in certifying the accuracy of the financial 
statements.”204 
Finally, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon was the most aggressive 
in recognizing that “[w]hile any of [the accounting] allegations standing alone 
would not necessarily demonstrate  scienter,”205 the Sarbanes-Oxley certifications 
provided an inference of at least deliberate recklessness, and would “give rise to an 
inference of scienter because they provide evidence either that defendants knew 
about the [accounting misrepresentations] or, alternatively, knew that the controls 
they attested to were inadequate.”206  Therefore, these certifications, “in 
combination with plaintiffs’ allegations. . . are sufficient to create a strong inference 
of actual knowledge or of deliberate recklessness.”207 Although the Watchguard, 
Garfield, and Lattice decisions represent holdings involving corporate insiders, a 
similar reasoning may apply to the Section 404(b) certifications by the auditor, 
because of the extent of knowledge and understanding such certifications warrant 
on the underlying nature of the business, the processes in place with the client to 
manage the business, and the ensuing financial statements.208  Consequently, the 
rule which seems to emerge from these three cases is a strong indicator of the future 
liability of auditors.  All three courts agree that a Section 404(b) certification, 
standing alone, is not a sufficient condition to establish scienter.209 Also, all three 
courts agree that, should plaintiffs show specific allegations of reckless conduct by 
corporate insiders, the Section 404(b) certification would be reviewed as additional 
indicia of scienter, where it could show defendants “either knew of the book 
cooking or knew that their financial controls were inadequate.”210  All three courts 
refused to “transform the PSLRA’s requirement of falsity-plus-scienter into a 
requirement of falsity-plus-a-Sarbanes-Oxley-certification,”211 and all three 
decisions were rendered prior to Tellabs.212 
 
 202.  Id. at 1266. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  In re Lattice Semiconductor Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV04-1255-AA, 2006 WL 538756, at *1 (D. Or. Jan. 
3, 2006), abrogated by Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F. 981 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 206.  Id. at *18. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  See supra note 102. 
 209.  See supra notes 199, 200, and 203. 
 210.  In re Watchguard Sec. Litig., Master File No. C05-678JLR 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27217, at *33 (W.D. 
Wash. Apr. 21, 2006). 
 211.  Id. at *34. 
 212.  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Pre-Tellabs Federal Common Law Standard of Scienter Analysis for the 
Auditor. 
Even though the legal standard of scienter was subject to various interpretations 
amongst the federal circuits after the PSLRA became law, courts did share common 
analysis principles to rule on the scienter pleading requirement. An analysis of 
sixteen decisions across all circuits between 1999 and 2007 included eight decisions 
where courts dismissed the complaint against the auditor and eight decisions where 
courts rejected the auditor’s motion to dismiss.213 In all of these decisions common 
criteria emerge even though the approaches to the scienter analysis differ because of 
the various PSLRA interpretations across the circuit courts.214 
First, the level of required recklessness necessary to comply with Ernst & Ernst 
must be so strong as to lead to a substantial abandonment of the professional duty 
of the auditor: “Recklessness on the part of an independent auditor entails a mental 
state so culpable that it ‘approximate[s] an actual intent to aid in the fraud being 
perpetrated by the audited company.’”215 In this view, scienter “requires more than a 
misapplication of accounting principles. The [plaintiff] must prove that the 
accounting practices were so deficient that the audit amounted to no audit at all, or 
an egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate the doubtful, or that the 
accounting judgments which were made were such that no reasonable accountant 
would have made the same decisions if confronted with the same facts.”216 
Second, at the summary judgment stage, courts consistently impose on the 
plaintiff an awareness requirement because “when the standard of recklessness for 
an auditor is overlaid with the pleading requirements of the PSLRA, a simple rule 
emerges: to allege that an independent accountant or auditor acted with scienter, 
the complaint must allege specific facts showing that the deficiencies in the audit  
 
 
 
 
 213.  See infra Appendix 1. 
 214.  See supra note 95. 
 215.  In re Cardinal Health Sec. Litig., 426 F. Supp. 2d 688, 763 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (citing Decker v. Massey-
Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 1982); Pegasus Fund, Inc. v. Laraneta, 617 F.2d 1335, 1341 (9th Cir. 
1980) (noting that an auditor’s recklessness “must come closer to being a lesser form of intent [to deceive] than 
merely a greater degree of ordinary negligence” (internal quotations omitted))). 
 216.  PR Diamonds Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 693–94 (6th
  
Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citing In re 
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1426 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
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were so severe that they strongly suggest that the auditor must have been aware of 
the corporation’s fraud.” 217 
Third, federal courts consider the presence of several factors, although they do 
not provide any indication as to the minimum number of factors required to meet 
the minimum threshold of recklessness or scienter by the auditor. However, courts 
will defeat the auditor’s motion to dismiss where most of the following factors are 
established: (1) the auditor violated GAAP or GAAS;218 (2) the accounting 
irregularities were of significant magnitude, i.e. whether the impact of the 
violations, the alleged fraud or of the misstatements or improprieties were 
material;219 (3) numerous and significant “red flags,”220 which are “those facts which 
come to the attention of an auditor which would place a reasonable auditor on 
notice that the audited company was engaged in wrongdoing to the detriment of its 
investors;”221 and (4) violation of internal policies or weaknesses in internal controls 
known to the auditor.222  On the other hand, courts will dismiss the plaintiff’s 
 
 217.  Cardinal Health, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 764 (quoting PR Diamonds, 364 F.3d at 693); see also Decker v. 
Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d at 120–21 (“Assuming for the argument that recklessness on the part of a non-
fiduciary accountant will satisfy [the] requirement of scienter, such recklessness must be conduct that is highly 
unreasonable, representing an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care.  It must, in fact, 
approximate an actual intent to aid in the fraud being perpetrated by the audited company.” (internal citations 
omitted)); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that scienter can be established by 
a “showing of shoddy accounting practices amounting at best to a pretended audit, or of grounds supporting a 
representation so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief [in] back of it” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 218.  See In re Hamilton Bankcorp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (“In 
instances where plaintiffs have pled facts explaining how the standards were recklessly or consciously violated, 
however, courts have found them probative.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 219.  See In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 493, 506 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (“[A] number of courts have 
recognized that the magnitude of the fraud, while not determinative of scienter, is probative of it.”) (internal 
citations omitted); see also P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Cendant Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 589, 608 (D.N.J. 
2001) (aside from a violation of GAAP, other circumstances suggesting fraudulent intent can include the 
presence of red flags and the magnitude of the alleged fraud). 
 220.  In securities litigation, “red flags” are “‘specific, highly suspicious’ facts and circumstances available to 
the auditor at the time of the audit.” In re Bally Total Fitness Sec. Litig., No. 04-C-3530, 2007 WL 551574, at *11 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2007) (citing Riggs Partners, LLC v. Hub Group, Inc., No. 02-C-1188, 2002 WL 31415721, at 
*9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2002)). “Red flags” are also described as “circumstances that would have put the 
defendants on notice that [Cardinal’s] financial statements and press releases contained material misstatements 
or omissions, or at least would have given them reasons to question the veracity of the statements.” Cardinal 
Health., 426 F. Supp. 2d at 738–39 (citing PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 91 F. App’x. 418, 432 (6th Cir. 
2004)). 
 221.  Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing In re Sunterra Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1334 (M.D. Fla. 2002)). 
 222.  See Rent-Way, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 508 (“We find that these allegations are of the requisite particularity 
and that they, similar to the allegations in In re Ikon, paint a picture of PwC as knowledgeable about the 
significant problems in its client’s internal control systems and as having reason to know that these problems 
were occurring when it issued its unqualified audit opinions. Accordingly, we find that Plaintiffs’ claims 
regarding PwC’s knowledge in this respect are probative of scienter.” (citing In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 66 F. Supp. 2d 622, 632 (E.D. Pa. 1999)). 
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complaint when few of the above factors are present simultaneously,223 when the 
GAAP violations are less egregious in nature and magnitude, where the alleged red 
flags would lack significant magnitude or would not rise to the level of a symptom 
of a inadequate audit process or are conclusory in nature,224 where the plaintiff’s 
claim would constitute no more than second-guessing an audit process which was 
accomplished according to proper GAAS procedures,225 or when plaintiff is not 
putting forward any indicia that the auditor knew of the accounting misconduct or 
improprieties.  In these cases, red flags alone, or GAAP violations alone, or second-
guessing of auditor calculations or audit procedures are not sufficient.226 
B. Impact of the PCAOB Administrative Case Law, Combined with the Section 404(b) 
Certification on the Federal Common Law Test 
The creation of the PCAOB by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a direct response to the 
perceived failure of the system of self-regulation of auditors, which was described as 
“a Byzantine structure of accounting disciplinary bodies which generally lack 
adequate and assured financial support, clear and undivided responsibility for 
discipline, and an effective system of SEC oversight.”227 To implement a system of 
independent regulation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provided a broad enforcement 
mandate to the PCAOB, by vesting the Board with the authority to register public 
accounting firms, to define auditing standards for auditing, ethics and 
independence, to inspect the largest public accounting firms, to investigate the 
firms and associated persons for violations of PCAOB-issued rules, and impose 
 
 223.  See In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 277 F.3d 658, 673 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he discovery of 
discrete errors after subjecting an audit to piercing scrutiny post-hoc does not, standing alone, support a finding 
of intentional deceit or of recklessness.” (emphasis added) (citing In re Software Toolworks Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 
627 (9th Cir. 1994) (“the mere publication of inaccurate accounting figures, or a failure to follow GAAP, 
without more, does not establish scienter”))); see also SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217, 1240 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (misapplication of accounting principles by an independent auditor, alone, is insufficient to 
establish scienter).   
 224.  Nappier v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP, 227 F. Supp. 2d 263, 278 (D.N.J. 2002) (“[S]o-called ‘red 
flags,’ which should be deemed to have put a defendant on notice of alleged improprieties, must be closer to 
‘smoking guns’ than mere warning signs.”) (citations omitted).  
 225.  See In re Ikon Office Solutions, 277 F.3d at 673 (“To give rise to section 10(b) liability for fraud, the 
mere second-guessing of calculations will not suffice; appellants must show that [the auditor]’s judgment-at the 
moment exercised-was sufficiently egregious such that a reasonable accountant reviewing the facts and figures 
should have concluded that IKON’s financial statements were misstated and that as a result the public was likely 
to be misled.”); cf. Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978) (rejecting “fraud by hindsight” allegation 
because lack of clairvoyance does not constitute fraud).  
 226.  See infra notes 218–220 and accompanying text. 
 227.  Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 532 (2002) (statement of Joel Seligman, Dean 
&  University Professor, Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law). 
CIRIC (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2014  5:11 PM 
 Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place 
266 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
disciplinary sanctions against both firms and individuals for such violations, 
including censures, temporary suspensions, permanent bars and fines.228 
This new oversight is leading to the formation of a body of administrative case 
law which should provide critical guidance to federal courts in modifying the legal 
test of scienter for auditors.  In eleven enforcement cases decided to-date,229 six of 
those involved “intentional or knowing conduct, including reckless conduct that 
results in a violation of the applicable statutory, regulatory, or professional 
standard.”230 
The PCAOB jurisprudence provides an important basis to illustrate its own 
threshold for scienter. In all cases, the firm or the professional subject to the 
PCOAB enforcement failed to adhere to the GAAP standards,231 and either did not 
apply proper professional quality control procedures or failed to apply fraud 
detection guidelines.232 Finally, the failure to remedy these violations following 
regular inspections, or the repetitive pattern of these violations across many audit 
 
 228.  See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and its Public/Private 
Status, NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 977–78, 983 n.40 (2005); see also Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, 
Investigations, Inspections, and Audits in the Post-SOX Environment, 86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 87 (2007). 
 229.  Settled Disciplinary Orders, PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., http://pcaobus.org/Enforcement/ 
Decisions/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2014). 
 230.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act preserves two clear avenues of enforcement for the Board, one which is 
similar to either one of the three readings of the Ernst & Ernst scienter standard, of either intentional, knowing 
or reckless conduct, and the other, consisting in the much lower threshold of negligent, but repetitive, conduct.  
Finally, a violation is not based upon a state of mind analysis, but is based upon an objective violation of any 
standard the Board or the SEC implements.  Consequently, a technical violation of any of the standards defined 
in Auditing Standard 5 for instance, would constitute a “knowing” or “reckless” conduct, leading to the 
application of the sanctions under Section 105(c)(4). See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 
7215(c)(4)(A)–(G) (2012). 
 231.  Sanctions under the combined effect of Sections 105(c)(4) and 105(c)(5) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 were applied to a number of cases. In four cases, the PCAOB ordered the registration of the firm revoked, 
either temporarily or permanently, and in two cases, the accounting firms were censured. Three professional 
accountants were permanently barred and four professional accountants were temporarily barred. See infra 
Appendix 2. 
 232.  As the PCAOB worked to define and adopt new Auditing Standards, it also adopted several pre-
existing standards created by the AICPA’s Auditing Standard Board. Among those, the Board, through PCAOB 
Release No. 2007-001, adopted AU § 316.68, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. PUB. CO. 
ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., PCAOB RELEASE NO. 2007-001, OBSERVATIONS ON AUDITORS’ IMPLEMENTATION 
OF PCAOB STANDARDS RELATING TO AUDITORS’ RESPONSIBILITIES WITH RESPECT TO FRAUD, at 1, 6 (2007), 
available at http://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Documents/2007_01-22_Release_2007-001.pdf. However, in its 
release, the Board went further in stepping up the auditor’s responsibility in detecting financial fraud by stating 
that the “auditor should, therefore, assess risks and apply procedures directed specifically to the detection of a 
material, fraudulent misstatement of the financial statements.”  Id. at 2. AU § 316.68 was deleted, but it was 
completely incorporated into Auditing Standard No. 14, Appendix C through PCAOB Release No. 2010-004, 
effective for audits of fiscal years beginning on or after December 15, 2010. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT 
BD., PCAOB RELEASE NO. 2010-004, AUDITING STANDARDS RELATED TO THE AUDITOR’S ASSESSMENT OF AND 
RESPONSE TO RISK AND RELATED AMENDMENT TO PCAOB STANDARDS, at A10-86 (2010), available at 
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket%20026/Release_2010-004_Risk_Assessment.pdf.  
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assignments usually constitutes an aggravating factor for the PCAOB.233 In 
evaluating a claim against a public accounting firm, federal courts are only required 
to analyze the scienter requirement in light of both U.S. Supreme Court guidance 
and the PSLRA mandate, and are not bound by administrative rules or 
interpretation by federal agencies which resolve claims under their delegated 
mandate.  Additionally, in case of conflicts between a judiciary review of an 
administrative rule and an agency interpretation of that rule, the federal courts 
would argue that their interpretation would win over the agency views, because the 
supremacy clause would enable the courts to subject a PCAOB’s resolution of a 
claim against an auditor to judicial review principles.234 
However, if challenged in federal court by an auditor claiming that the PCAOB 
rule or its application was “arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with the law,”235 the PCAOB could argue that its 
stricter interpretation of the scienter rule would resist any judicial challenge from 
an auditor claiming he was subject to a more severe scienter standard under the 
PCAOB rule than the federal common law rule because the PCAOB enforcement 
rule would be a permissible interpretation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, “the 
regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a 
detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 233.  See Armando C. Ibarra, P.C., PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., PCAOB RELEASE NO. 2006-009, 
at 4–13 (Dec. 19, 2006); Turner Stone & Company, LLP, PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., PCAOB 
RELEASE NO. 2006-010, at 9 (Dec. 19, 2006); Clyde Bailey, P.C., PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., PCAOB 
RELEASE NO. 2005-021, at 3–11 (Nov. 22, 2005). 
 234.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (holding that the judiciary has the final authority to 
“say what the law is”). When different interpretations between the judiciary and the administrative agency are 
at-issue, the Administrative Procedure Act reinforces the Marbury holding by evaluating agency action under 
the “arbitrary and capricious” review standard. See Administrative Procedure Act § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) 
(“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions 
of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the 
terms of an agency action.”). 
 235.  Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2)(A). 
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policies.”236 Consequently, it is technically possible for two scienter standards to co-
exist, a strict scienter standard within the scope of the PCAOB jurisdiction, and a 
looser standard for scienter which may very well continue to develop after Tellabs.237  
Such a scenario would not be resolved under traditional conflict of laws principles, 
as the jurisdiction of the PCAOB is well delineated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
the federal courts jurisdiction for Rule 10b-5 claims would be protected by the 1934 
Act and its U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.  However, such a situation could 
lead to increasingly difficult positions for the judiciary.  If the two standards start to 
significantly diverge, one could imagine two potential arguments by plaintiffs in 
federal courts. First under the Due Process Clause,238 a plaintiff could argue 
“reversed arbitrariness” by the federal judiciary because the court, by applying too 
restrictive of a scienter requirement compared to the administrative interpretation 
of the same standard, abandoned the plaintiff’s interests and violated the interest-
balancing doctrine.239 
Second, plaintiffs in the civil case against the auditor could rely on the argument 
made by Judge Wood in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Makor 
 
 236.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).  “When a court 
reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, 
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as 
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based 
on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 842–43. Under the Chevron deference rule, the PCAOB 
would easily argue that it adheres to all three prongs of the U.S. Supreme Court analysis: the Sarbanes-Oxley 
regulatory scheme as it applies to the PCAOB rules, and its interactions with the 1933 and 1934 Acts, is based on 
highly technical and complex accounting rules and standards, such as GAAP and GAAS.  The PCAOB rules 
regarding auditor standards have relied on professional review, such as the AICPA.  The PCAOB accounting 
and disciplinary rules balance the interests of compliance with cost considerations, such as the changes brought 
by Accounting Standard No. 5 compared to Accounting Standard No. 2. Therefore, the PCAOB is almost 
certain to defeat any legal challenge of its disciplinary decisions under the Chevron and APA §706 standards. 
 237.  See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 328–29 (2007). 
 238.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 239.  See Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Towards Limits on the Use of Interest 
Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1510 (1975) (“Due process adjudication typically involves two analytically 
distinct issues: whether the right to due process is applicable; and, if so, what procedures must be provided. 
Resolution of the first issue requires a finding as to whether the governmentally inflicted deprivation in 
question intrudes upon a liberty or property interest possessed by the individual. If the deprivation is found to 
be of a type which triggers the litigant’s entitlement to due process, a determination must then be made of 
which specific procedures are required by the right. Under present doctrine the form of due process depends 
upon a utilitarian balancing of the conflicting interests in which the individual’s need for requested procedural 
safeguards is weighed against the governmental interest in summary or informal action.”). 
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Issues & Rights v. Tellabs,240 when it noticed that too strong of an inference standard 
in evaluating scienter could potentially infringe upon plaintiffs’ Seventh 
Amendment rights to a jury.241 One could imagine that such an argument would 
find new force in the following situation: assume a plaintiff is defeated in its claim 
against an auditor in federal court under a less stringent scienter requirement, only 
to find out that the PCAOB held the auditor in violation of its Rules,242 had warned 
the auditor in many inspections,243 and ultimately disciplined or barred the auditor.  
Under this scenario, a Seventh Amendment violation argument may find new force, 
by arguing that the combination of the heightened pleading requirement and too 
high of a substantial scienter threshold prevented the plaintiff to present a valid case 
to a jury.  Consequently, the PCAOB scienter standard should serve as persuasive 
authority for federal courts to confirm an inference of knowledge on the part of the 
auditor from the Section 404(b) certification. 
V. SOLUTION 
To prevent a continuing and increasing tension between the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Section 404(b) requirements, the heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA, 
and administrative jurisprudence, courts should modify the legal analysis of the 
scienter requirement as applied to accountants by using a new approach consistent 
with both Tellabs and the PCAOB case law.  This new framework244 will rely on a 
few assumptions. First, the Section 404(b) requirement will be central to the 
analysis because it will determine whether the critical element of knowledge is met.  
The knowledge element is critical because the federal case law shows that the 
threshold issue is whether the accountant was aware of either a fraud, accounting 
improprieties, or of the weakness or absence of the appropriate controls necessary 
to detect the fraud or the improprieties.  Second, Tellabs requires that, for a 
complaint to survive, “a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter 
cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from 
 
 240.  437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that plaintiff’s complaint adequately alleged scienter as to 
statements made by Tellabs executives), rev’d and remanded, 551 U.S. 308 (2007).  
 241.  Id. at 602 (“One might argue that for cases where a juror could conclude that the facts pleaded show 
scienter, but that conclusion would not be the most plausible of competing inferences, a Seventh Amendment 
problem is presented.” (internal citation omitted)). Justice Ginsburg made sure that the Tellabs Court addressed 
that concern, which represented a significant amount of discussion during the oral arguments held on March 
28, 2007. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 326–27 (2007) (“In our view, the 
Seventh Circuit’s concern was undue. A court’s comparative assessment of plausible inferences, while constantly 
assuming the plaintiff’s allegations to be true, we think it plain, does not impinge upon the Seventh 
Amendment right to jury trial.”).  
 242.  See supra note 225. 
 243.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7214(g)(2) (2012). One could imagine the potential 
litigation between a plaintiff, an auditor, and the PCAOB, regarding the public release of the inspection reports 
during the 12-month interim period, especially if the auditor documented with the PCAOB the reasons why the 
report should not be released. 
 244.  See infra Appendix 3. 
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the facts alleged.”245 Consequently, the Tellabs analysis requires an objective 
standard to determine whether the scienter requirement has been met.  Because this 
approach essentially overrules the Second and Third Circuit’s former “motive and 
opportunity” approaches, federal courts will have to seek objective factors in 
measuring all facets of the scienter analysis, and most specifically with the 
knowledge requirement.  This element was precisely what the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and the PCAOB attempted to address by providing for disclosure rules consistent 
with the knowledge acquired by the auditor of the issuer’s control processes 
through Section 404(b).  Therefore, Accounting Standard No. 5, through the 
“significant deficiency” and “material weakness” disclosure mechanisms, provides 
tools consistent with the goals of Sarbanes-Oxley, and with the practices in line with 
PCAOB accounting standards.246 
Applying this approach, it is urged that federal courts adopt the following 
framework when analyzing the scienter requirement of a claim against a public 
accounting firm.247 
The first step in the analysis before examining all of the other inferences in the 
complaint should focus on the content of the Section 404(b) certification.  The 
court would first review whether the accounting firm complied with the Section 
404(b) disclosure, then which disclosure was made.  In the case of a material 
weakness disclosure, the defendant auditor will be able to defeat the impact of the 
inference of knowledge248 by arguing he complied with his statutory obligation to 
affirmatively disclose material weaknesses to the “Internal Control Over Financial 
Reporting.”249  This disclosure, which brings significantly negative consequences to 
the issuer,250 actually functions as an insurance policy against liability.  However, it 
 
 245.  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added).  
 246.  See supra notes 188–89. 
 247.  This framework would be applied in the third step described in the Tellabs analysis. See Tellabs, 551 
U.S. at 323 (“Third, in determining whether the pleaded facts give rise to a ‘strong’ inference of scienter, the 
court must take into account plausible opposing inferences.”). 
 248.  But see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing’s New Early Warning System: Control 
Disclosure, Auditor Liability and Safe Harbors, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1449, 1478 (2004) (claiming that the material 
weakness disclosure rules under Auditing Standard No. 2 functions as a disincentive to disclosure, due to their 
negative consequences). 
 249.  This is a defined term for the PCAOB. See AS 5, supra note 181, § A5 (2007) (internal control over 
financial reporting, includes those policies that: “(1) Pertain to the maintenance of records that, in reasonable 
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the company; (2) Provide 
reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the company 
are being made only in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of the company; and (3) 
Provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or 
disposition of the company’s assets that could have a material effect on the financial statements”). 
 250.  See C. Brune, Study Reveals Impact of Disclosing Weaknesses, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Feb. 2005, at 22 
(announcing that, based on a study conducted by A.R.C. Morgan, 62 percent of CEOs from companies which 
disclosed weaknesses left within 3 months of the disclosure, and that, in most cases, the disclosure triggers an 
investigation by the SEC). 
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remains to be seen whether plaintiffs could prove that a strong inference of scienter 
may be found from the record if the financial statements were the object of an 
unqualified opinion and the auditor still issued a material weakness opinion as to 
the Internal Control Over Financial Reporting. Then, if the auditor either issued a 
significant deficiency or issued an unqualified opinion under Section 404(b), the 
court would move to the second step in the analysis.251 
In the second step, the court would need objective criteria to determine whether 
“the accounting practices were so deficient that the audit amounted to no audit at 
all, an egregious refusal to see the obvious or to investigate the doubtful, or that the 
accounting judgments which were made were such that no reasonable accountant 
would have made the same decisions if confronted with the same facts.”252 To 
comply with the Tellabs objective analysis requirement and using a unified 
approach using prior case law, courts would need to consider several factors in 
evaluating the various inferences presented by the plaintiff investor and the 
defendant auditor. However, in order to comply with Tellabs, the court will need to 
conclude “whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a strong 
inference of scienter, not whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in isolation, 
meets that standard.”253  In addition, when reviewing these factors, the aggregation 
of these factors would have to comply with the Tellabs requirement of concluding 
that “the inference of scienter must be more than merely ‘reasonable’ or 
‘permissible’ — it must be cogent and compelling, thus strong in light of other 
explanations.”254 To that end, courts will need the consider the following: (1) 
whether the auditor violated GAAP or GAAS;255 (2) whether the GAAP/GAAS 
violations were of significant magnitude in the aggregate of all the violations which 
were pled in the complaint, i.e. whether the impact of the violations, the alleged 
fraud or of the misstatements or improprieties were material, or whether the 
violations were not so egregious that their impact was not material;256 (3) whether 
the auditor was on notice of the alleged violations, fraudulent accounting, fraud 
misstatements or improprieties; (4) whether other red flags were suspicious enough 
that an auditor would exercise sufficient due diligence to investigate whether 
material misstatements or omissions may exist which would impact the financial 
statements;257 (5) whether the alleged red flags that were ignored were of significant 
 
 251.  See Acevedo, supra note 53, at 31 n.182 (discussing the issuing of an unqualified opinion, which is the 
highest level or assurance that an auditor can give on an organization’s financial statement); supra notes 191–92 
and accompanying text. Assuming that only public information would be attached to the complaint, only a 
material weakness disclosure would be known to the plaintiff, as the stay on discovery would prevent him from 
uncovering the significant deficiency documentation. See 15 U.S.C §§ 77z-1(b), 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
 252.  SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citations omitted). 
 253.  Tellabs v. Makor, 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007). 
 254.  Id. at 324.  
 255.  See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 256.  See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 257.  See supra note 220–21 and accompanying text.  
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magnitude in the aggregate of all the red flags which were pled in the complaint, or 
whether these red flags merely constituted inconclusive or circumstantial 
violations;258 (6) to what degree the auditor was on notice of those ignored “red 
flags” alleged in the complaint, and ignored these “red flags,” and in doing so, 
violated PCAOB standards requiring them to exercise due professional care and 
professional skepticism in their performance of their audit work, or whether the 
auditor was unaware of either their existence or their magnitude; and (7) to what 
degree the auditor was aware of violation of internal policies or control procedures. 
At this stage, the Section 404(b) certification by the auditor should have been 
incorporated in the complaint to strengthen an inference of knowledge and notice 
by the auditor. This will require the court to determine whether the Section 404(b) 
certification constitutes a strong inference of knowledge of factors (3) through (7), 
since the certification to the effectiveness of internal controls over financial 
reporting means that the auditor certifies that he had knowledge of the issuer’s 
internal controls and if any material shortcomings in these internal controls had 
any impact on the veracity of the financial statements. 
To comply with the Tellabs objective test requirement, the former analysis of 
motive and opportunity would no longer be considered as a relevant factor.259 
In the third step where the court would apply these factors to the case at bar, the 
court would distinguish three situations in order to apply these factors to either 
distinguish or analogize prior case law.  The first situation would involve claims 
where few of the above factors would be present simultaneously,260 or where the 
alleged red flags would lack significant impact or would not rise to the level of 
indicia of suspicious accounting practices or improprieties, or would merely 
constitute inconclusive or circumstantial violations,261 or where the plaintiff’s claim 
would constitute no more than second guessing an audit process which was 
accomplished according to proper GAAS procedures.262  In these cases, the Section 
404(b) certification and the presence of a notice of significant deficiency or material 
weakness would have no impact because the plaintiff would have failed to plead a 
strong inference of scienter.263 
At the other extreme,264 the plaintiff would have been able to show significant 
GAAP and GAAS violations, and that “the magnitude of the misstatements, . . .the 
lack of internal controls in [several] problem areas, . . .the number of restatements, 
 
 258.  See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 259.  See supra note 245 and accompanying text.  
 260.  See infra Appendix 3, Group I. 
 261.  See supra note 224 and accompanying text.  
 262.  See supra note 225 and accompanying text.  
 263.  At that level of disconnect, the evidence weaknesses probably undercut any primary liability theory 
asserted by the plaintiff investor, in which case Central Bank of Denver would apply. See supra notes 111–112 
and accompanying text. 
 264.  See infra Appendix 3, Group III. 
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the specific GAAP and GAAS violations” which constituted, in the aggregate “an 
extreme departure from standards of ordinary care in a manner that was not 
significantly undermined by any purported disclosure by” the auditor.265 
Circumstances such as poor auditing processes which prevented the auditor to 
honor its “obligation to review and evaluate those records in order to form an 
opinion regarding. . . financial statements” or to discover a “lack of documentation 
and the fraudulent accounting treatment” may also contribute to a strong inference 
of scienter because a proper audit process “would have discovered if it had taken 
those steps.”266 In such cases, the Section 404(b) certification combined with the 
absence of a notice of significant deficiency or material weakness would essentially 
strengthen a strong inference of knowledge by the auditor of the failure in the 
control processes that led to fraudulent or improper accounting supporting a fraud.  
In such a case, the Section 404(b) certification would be additional support to the 
finding of a strong inference of scienter. 
Between these two extremes lay a series of cases with specific characteristics.267 
Often, a complaint will claim significant GAAP violations by the auditor, along with 
a clear disregard of significant “red flags,” such as accounting irregularities 
impacting specific business items having a critical impact on the business of the 
issuer, and the lack of internal controls associated with these items.268 
In these cases, usually because of the PSLRA’s stay on discovery requirement, the 
plaintiff’s complaint is unable to allege specific facts pointing to the actual auditor’s 
knowledge of the extent of the accounting improprieties, or how intimate the 
auditor was with the issuer management controls.269 In these cases, the courts 
usually conclude that “it is not sufficient for a plaintiff to state that because a 
defendant violated GAAP, the defendant knew or must have known that it was 
publishing materially false information. Such a violation, on its own, does not 
 
 265.  In re Hamilton Bankcorp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 
 266.  In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10863, at *22 
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2003).  
 267.  See infra Appendix 3, Group II. 
 268.  See In re Cardinal Health Sec. Litig., 426 F. Supp. 2d 688, 702–09 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (alleging in a 
complaint that the scienter requirement was satisfied when the defendants’ ignored numerous “red flags” and 
committed GAAP violations); In re Sunterra Corp. Sec. Litig., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1333 (M.D. Fla. 2002) 
(“Plaintiffs contend that they have adequately alleged scienter on the part of Arthur Andersen based on (1) the 
magnitude of the GAAP violations by Sunterra; (2) Arthur Andersen’s awareness of the requirement that it 
comply with GAAS in conducting its audit; and (3) Arthur Andersen’s alleged disregard of ‘red flags.’”). 
 269.  See Sunterra, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1333, 1337 (holding that the plaintiffs had failed to show specific 
allegations of knowledge where the plaintiffs alleged “that the Arthur Andersen representative failed to disclose 
at the shareholders’ meeting Sunterra’s failure to keep books in accordance with ‘SEC rules [requiring it] to . . . 
maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to reasonably assure, among other things, that 
transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with 
GAAP’”). 
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represent the extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care that the 
recklessness standard requires.”270  However, 
“if such dereliction of responsibility is accompanied by other ‘red flags’ 
which the auditor chooses to ignore, there may be enough to establish 
scienter. ‘Red flags’ are those facts which come to the attention of an auditor 
which would place a reasonable auditor on notice that the audited company 
was engaged in wrongdoing to the detriment of its investors. . .  Whether 
scienter is sufficiently alleged may depend on the scope and severity of the 
auditor’s failure to pay heed to ‘red flags.’”271 
Hence, in this group of cases, “the heart of the issue as to the adequacy of the claim 
pled against [the auditor] concerns whether there were sufficient ‘red flags’ to put 
the auditor on notice that [the issuer] was engaged in wrongdoing to the detriment 
of its shareholders.”272 To resolve this issue, courts clearly struggle to pierce through 
the complaint to find out whether the specific facts alleged do raise an inference of 
the auditor being on notice of the accounting malfeasance, usually by observing the 
type and magnitude of the accounting errors.273  Therefore, courts recognize that, 
although GAAP “violations alone are insufficient” to establish a strong inference of 
scienter, such “GAAP and GAAS violations accompanied by ignorance of ‘red flags’ 
could be sufficient to state a claim for securities fraud against an independent 
accountant,”274 but in the absence of a stronger inference of knowledge by the 
auditor, the other allegations “fall short of tilting the scales in favor of a finding of a 
strong inference of severe recklessness.”275 
As it relates to the Section 404(b) certification, courts have already understood 
its impact on the inference analysis as it relates to the insider defendant who 
approves the financial statements.  At least one court has held that “a Sarbanes-
Oxley certification is only probative of scienter if the person signing the certification 
was severely reckless in certifying the accuracy of the financial statements. This 
requirement is satisfied if the person signing the certification had reason to know, 
or should have suspected, due to the presence of glaring accounting irregularities or 
other ‘red flags,’ that the financial statements contained material misstatements or 
 
 270.  See id. at 1333 (quoting Malin v. Ivax Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 1998)).  
 271.  Id. at 1333–34; see also Van De Velde v. Coopers & Lybrand, 899 F. Supp. 731, 735–36 (D. Mass. 1995) 
(“A complaint will usually survive a motion to dismiss if plaintiffs have alleged the existence of ‘red flags’ 
sufficiently attention-grabbing to have alerted a reasonable auditor to the audited company’s shenanigans.”). 
 272.  Sunterra, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1334. 
 273.  See cases cited supra note 218. 
 274.  See Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp., No. 98–6879–CIV–GOLD, 2000 WL 1140306, at *11 (S.D. Fla. July 
31, 2000). 
 275.  In re Sunterra Corp. Sec. Litig., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1338 (M.D. Fla. 2002). 
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omissions.”276  As the Tellabs court did not specify, there should be no difference in 
the scienter analysis between an insider and an auditor, to the extent that an 
inference of knowledge can be construed from a Sarbanes-Oxley certification.  The 
certifications by the insider officers and by the auditor provide that both parties 
affirmatively state that they investigated the control process and procedures of the 
entity, as well as the effectiveness of the management controls of the entity and they 
are therefore comfortable that such controls allow all material aspect of the financial 
statements to be accurate.  Because both the insider officers277 and the auditors278 
certify to these affirmative statements, a similar inference of knowledge will be 
drawn by the court.  Consequently, in the case of the auditor, the Section 404(b) 
certification is likely to “tilt[] the scales in favor of a finding of a strong inference of 
severe recklessness.”279 
Although the threshold requirements to establish a strong inference of scienter 
or recklessness under Tellabs are likely to generate significant litigation in the 
future, this analytical framework will help reconcile the impact of the Section 
404(b) certification with the PSLRA pleading requirement of scienter. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Under Tellabs v. Makor,280 federal circuit courts will need to reconcile their mandate 
for strict enforcement of the PSLRA pleading requirements with the critical goal of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of increased disclosure and adherence to enhanced auditing 
professional standards. By implementing a consistent approach, which incorporates 
the framework of Auditing Standard No.5 and the PCAOB administrative case law, 
federal courts will ensure that they properly balance the need to triage frivolous 
section 10(b) suits from meritorious securities fraud claims against public 
accounting firms.  This change will ensure that the federal courts strengthen their 
roles as a litigation watchdog, and as the pilot who “has guided the fate of vessels on 
the seas,” will possess “the knowledge and skill necessary to navigate through 
storms and treacherous waters” of litigation.281 
 
 276.  Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 277.  Section 404(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act states that management is required to produce an “internal 
control report” as part of each 10K Annual Report, which must attest to “the responsibility of management for 
establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting.” 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (2012). 
 278.  Under Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, external auditors are required to issue an opinion on 
whether effective internal control over financial reporting was maintained in all material respects by 
management. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2012). This is in addition to the financial statement opinion regarding the 
accuracy of the financial statements. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2012).  
 279.  Sunterra, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1338. 
 280.  551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
 281.  See Robert Edward Guidry, The Seamen Who Have Walked the Plank on Statutory Negligence Remedies: 
The Pilot’s Dilemma, 1 LOY. MAR. L.J. 117, 117 (2002).  
CIRIC (Do Not Delete) 4/1/2014  5:11 PM 
 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 276 
Name Year Circuit Auditor Scienter Analysis Claim against Facts Outcome Auditor Outcome Net
Auditor Auditor Wins/LosesPost TellabsChange
In Re Hamilton BankCorp Sec Litig2002 Southern DC oDeloitte GAAP violations, control weakness, red flags, magnitude, scope Deloitte, Hamilton's Hamilton [**1 MD denied Loses Loses
Teachers Ret. Of LA v. ACLN (PWC2003 Southern DC oBDO SeidmGAAS violations, no reporting, reckless procedures, conflict of interest BDO International Bde-listing by NMD denied Loses Loses
In Re Lernout & Hauspie 2002 Mass KPMG Revenue recognition, false statements, red flags, misconduct, lack of internal controls KPMG Singapore, B2000 bankrupMD denied (ULoses Loses
In Re Sunbeam Sec. Litigation 1999 Southern FLA Andersen GAAP/GAAS violations, on notice of fraudulent accounting, magnitude, internal controls -- it elected not to exrestructuring MD denied Loses Loses
In Re Rent-Way Securities Litigatio2002 Western PA PWC GAAP violations, control, red flags, magnitude GAAP, red glags, coPlaintiffs' othMD denied Loses Loses
Whalen v. Hibernia Foods 2005 Southern DC oPWC
GAAP violations, reckless disregard to risk factors, red flags, on notice of fraudulent 
accounting, motive PwC knew or recklessly disregardMD denied Loses Loses
In Re Worldcom Securities Litig 2003 Southern Dist Andersen GAAP violations, magnitude, on notice of fraudulent accounting, absence of controls Taken as a wMD denied Loses Loses
Arnlund v. Deloitte & Touche 2002 Southern VA Deloitte Material uncertainty, knowledge of imminent bankruptcy, knowledge of liquidity problems It is alleged in the Amended CompMD denied Loses Loses
In Re Cardinal Health 2006 Southern DC oE&Y
GAAP/GAAS violations, improper practices, red flags BUT no evidence auditor knew or 
of misconduct violation of §§MD granted Wins Loses Loses
Garfield v NDC 2006 11th E&Y GAAP/GAAS violations, red flags,  BUT SOX not probative. MD granted Wins Loses Loses
In Re SunTerra Corp Sec Litigation2002 Central FL Andersen
GAAP violations, material misstatements, red flags, improper accounting practices: (1) 
the magnitude of the GAAP violations by Sunterra; (2) Arthur Andersen's awareness of 
the requirement that it comply with GAAS in conducting its audit; and (3) Arthur 
Andersen's alleged disregard of "red flags," BUT whether there were sufficient "red 
flags" to put the auditor on notice that Sunterra was engaged in wrongdoing to the 
detriment of its shareholders. NO. Just negligence. whether there were Chapter 11 baMD granted Wins Loses Loses
In Re Faro Technologies Securitie 2007 Central FL Grant Thor
GAAP violations, improper accounting practices, red flags, lack of internal controls BUT 
circumstancial. the existence of scierestatement, MD granted Wins ? ?
PR Diamonds v. Chandler 2004 6th Andersen
GAAP violations, improper practices, control deficiencies, red flags BUT less egregious 
in nature and magnitude (These alleged accounting and reporting problems do not 
resemble the pervasive and egregious manipulations found to support a strong 
inference of scienter in other cases) MD granted Wins ? ?
In Re Polaroid Corp Sec. Litigation2006 Southern DC oKPMG
Refinancing misopinion, lack of thoroughness, but it does not, without more, 
demonstrate recklessness. No knowledge issue. Deferred Tax AssetsPolaroid's "acMD granted Wins Wins
In Re Bally Total Fitness Sec Litiga2006 Northern DC oE&Y 12 red flags,  BUT insufficient. unqualified opinions GAAP violatioMD granted Wins Wins
In Re Ikon Office Solutions 2002 ED PA E&Y control weaknesses, red flags BUT mere second-guessing of calculations insuficient Statement overestiaReckless in faMD granted Wins Wins
APPENDIX 1: TABLE OF FEDERAL 10(b) CLAIMS CASES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CIRIC (Do Not Delete) 4/1/2014  5:11 PM 
 Pierre Ciric 
Vol. 9, No. 2 2014 277 
Name Cite Year Defendant Facts Holding
W
In the Matter of Willams & Webster PCAOB Release No. 105-2007-001 2007 Williams, Webester, CPAViolation of § 150.02, Generally Accepted Audit Firm censured, temporary barred
In the Matter of Benson PCAOB Release NO.1 05-2007 -002 2007 Benson Audit of Conversion Solution Holdings Corp. IntePerson Barred, registration revoked
In the Matter of Clyde Bailey PCAOB Release No. 2005-021 2005 Bailey Audit of Endevco, related parties txs, revenue rePerson Barred, registration revoked
In the Matter of Armando C. Ibarra, P.C., PCAOB Release No. 2006-009 2006 Ibarra Audit of Triad, 600% overstatement. Audit of Natemporary barred, registration revoked
In the Matter of Kenny H. Lee CPA Group PCAOB Release No. 2005-022 2005 Lee Audit of GSL Holdings, Person Barred, registration revoked
In the Matter of Turner Stone & Company PCAOB Release No. 2006-010 2006 Turner Audit of 21st century, Bel Air, HCIA Firm censured, temporary barred
APPENDIX 2: TABLE OF PCAOB ENFORCEMENT CASES 
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Inference No Adverse Significant Material
Thresholds against the auditor Opinion Deficiency Weakness
GROUP I
Circumstancial inferences
Claims: GAAP violations, weak read flags, second guessing Motion granted Motion granted Motion granted
Cases: Bally, Ikon, Polaroid
GROUP II
Stronger than circumstancial inferences without indicia of knowledge
Claims: GAAP Violations, red flags, accounting impropr. MOTION DENIED MOTION DENIED Motion granted
Cases: Sunterra, Garfield, Cardinal (If magnitude present) (If magnitude present)
Group III
Strong inferences of scienter with evidence of knowledge
Claims: GAAP Violations, red flags, accounting impropr., MOTION DENIED MOTION DENIED Motion granted
             control weaknesses, magnitude.
Cases: Worldcom, Sunbeam, Hamilton
Note: Motion granted=Motion to Dismiss the 10(b) claim against Defendant Auditor granted. 
Note: MOTION DENIED=Motion to Dismiss the 10(b) claim against Defendant Auditor denied.
Note: italics areas cover cases which would come out differently post-Tellabs under section 404(b), compared to prior to Tellabs.
APPENDIX 3: SUMMARY TABLE OF CASE SEGMENTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
